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Population in Russia and Ukraine: Historical Trajectories and Dynamics Under the War

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Abstract

This paper examines the population dynamics of Russia and Ukraine, tracing their trajectories since the collapse of the Soviet Union while discussing the situation under the Ukraine War. Both Russia and Ukraine have experienced extremely severe population declines, but Ukraine's situation is far more profound. This is evident not only in rising mortality and declining fertility rates but also in the large scale of population outflows from Ukraine, particularly since the 21st century. However, grasping the situation in Ukraine is extremely difficult. No population census has been conducted since 2001, and data publication by the statistical bureau has ceased since 2021, necessitating reliance on various estimates. Naturally, population assessment under wartime conditions lacks accuracy in Russia as well, and updating information is essential. Nevertheless, Russia's natural population dynamics appear to be in a more favorable position compared not only to Ukraine but also to our own country.

Introduction

The population dynamics of the former socialist bloc—particularly those of the post-Soviet regions—have long attracted considerable scholarly attention. Around 1989–1991, coinciding with the onset of systemic transformation, these regions experienced a simultaneous surge in mortality and a precipitous decline in fertility. Consequently, population trends that had previously paralleled those of advanced economies shifted dramatically toward a pattern characterized by extremely low fertility and sustained natural population decline (Da Vanzo & Grammich, 2001; Kumo, 2011).

Within this context, demographic deterioration was most pronounced in the European part of the former Soviet Union, notably in Russia. Russia began to experience natural population decline in 1992, as deaths surpassed births, followed by Ukraine in 1991 (Figures 1a and 1b). Between 1992 and 2021, Russia recorded a cumulative natural decrease of 15.72 million persons, and Ukraine 8.02 million. Nevertheless, Russia's total population decreased by only 2.98 million, largely offset by an inflow exceeding 10 million migrants. By contrast, Ukraine's total population declined by approximately o10 million persons over the same period (based on estimates, as exact data are unavailable), reflecting a deeper demographic crisis driven by both natural decrease and net outmigration. Despite these differences, both countries have continued to exhibit persistent natural population decline (UNDP Russia, 2009; Kumo, 2014).

Figure 1a. Birth, Death and Natural Increase in Russia, 1960-2024.



Source: Demograficheskii ezhegodnik Rossii, Rosstat, various years.

Figure 1b. Birth, Death and Natural Increase in Ukraine, 1960～2024.



Source: https://ukrstat.gov.ua/, accessed June 15, 2025.

Although the absolute scale of natural decline has been greater in Russia, its relative magnitude—measured as a share of total population—has been far more severe in Ukraine. The average annual natural decline relative to the 1992 population stood at 0.35% in Russia and 0.60% in Ukraine, with Ukraine's overall demographic contraction further compounded by emigration. Against this backdrop of ongoing population loss, the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine War has added a new dimension to the demographic situation. Given that population trends inevitably shape the future capacity for military and economic mobilization, this study examines the demographic trajectories of both countries to assess their broader implications.[1].

[1] Regarding the data utilized in this paper. Ukraine has not conducted a population census since the one on December 5, 2001; consequently, the precise population size remains unknown to anyone (population data for years without a census are, whether in Japan or the United States, invariably estimates). Furthermore, the State Statistics Service of Ukraine ceased publishing detailed population data after 2021. Despite this, it is well known that various figures pertaining to births, deaths, international migration, and the like circulate widely in the media. For the period from 2021 onward, this paper employs data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine and the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation whenever obtainable; otherwise, to ensure comparability between Russia and Ukraine, estimates from the United Nations or the World Bank are utilized. These are estimates produced by the United Nations or the World Bank based on figures reported by national statistical agencies and cannot be regarded as accurate. Nevertheless, this selection was made because the estimations are performed by the United Nations or the World Bank, thereby enabling the avoidance of criticisms that Russian authorities / Ukrainian authorities are fabricating the figures. Note that Ukraine's total population is fundamentally abstracted from consideration, as the discrepancies among various estimates are excessively large and potentially misleading.

1. Trends in Fertility

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the closure or privatization of enterprise- and state-operated childcare facilities, combined with severe economic hardship that rendered childrearing increasingly costly, precipitated a sharp decline in fertility across the former Soviet republics. In Russia, the total fertility rate (TFR) exceeded the replacement level of 2.0 in 1989 but fell below 1.5 within only five years, and dropped further to below 1.2 by 1999–2000. The rapidity of this decline is striking when compared with Japan, where it took two decades—from 1974 to 1993—for the TFR to fall from above 2.0 to below 1.5 (Kumo, 2011).

In response, Russia introduced various pronatalist measures beginning in 2006, most notably the "Maternity Capital" program. While TFR recovered gradually after 2000, it has followed a clear downward trajectory since 2016 (Figure 2). This pattern suggests that cash-based pronatalist incentives may exert only temporary or timing effects, failing to generate sustained improvements in fertility rates (Zhuravleva & Gavrilova, 2017; Kumo & Kechetova, 2023).

Figure 2. Total Fertility Rate, 1960-2024 (RU), -2021(Uk)



Source: Demograficheskii ezhegodnik Rossii, Rosstat, various years; https://ukrstat.gov.ua/, accessed June 15, 2025.

A similar trend is observed in Ukraine. As shown in Figure 2, Ukraine's fertility pattern broadly mirrors that of Russia. During the 2000s, Ukraine also implemented

financial incentives for childbirth; however, these benefits amounted to roughly one-tenth of those offered in Russia, limiting their effectiveness. Although the stabilization of economic and political conditions in the 2010s contributed to a moderate fertility recovery, the discontinuation of financial support after 2010 curtailed further progress. Perelli-Harris et al. (2024) emphasize that the persistent lack of social stability and widespread uncertainty about the future have strongly discouraged childbearing decisions.

Even with a moderate fertility rebound, the extent to which it can arrest the decline in the number of births (Figures 1a and 1b) ultimately depends on the age structure of the population. For both Russia and Ukraine, the demographic momentum shaped by their current age distributions predetermines continued population decline, a topic addressed in subsequent sections.

2. Trends in Mortality

Historically, the former socialist bloc has exhibited comparatively high mortality levels. Life expectancy at birth—derived from the summation of age-specific survival rates—serves as a key inverse indicator of mortality and fluctuates accordingly with changes in death rates.

As illustrated in Figure 3, clear divergences can be observed between Western Europe and Eastern Europe/former Soviet states. While Western Europe has experienced a steady extension of male life expectancy since 1960, the Eastern European and post-Soviet regions (depicted by red and black solid or dashed lines) demonstrated stagnation through the late socialist period, followed by marked declines around the time of regime collapse. Subsequent recovery began in Eastern Europe in the late 1990s and in the former Soviet Union in the early 2000s.

Although infant mortality typically exerts the strongest influence on life expectancy at birth, Figure 4 indicates that infant mortality in both Russia and Ukraine continued to decline even amid the turmoil of the early transition period. The sharp contraction of life expectancy observed between the late 1980s and early 2000s thus primarily reflects rising adult male mortality during those years (Kumo, 2016).

From the late 2000s onward, this trend reversed, with both countries exhibiting improvements in life expectancy—except in 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic caused temporary setbacks.

Figure 3. Male Life Expectancy at Birth: Wester Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, 1960-2023



Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank, accessed June 15, 2025.

Figure 4. Infant Mortality: Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, 1960-2023



Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank, accessed June 15, 2025.

The depth of the mortality crisis in both countries can be appreciated through

historical comparison. Ukraine's lowest recorded male life expectancy at birth was 61.55 years in 1996, and Russia's reached 57.6 years in 1994. By contrast, postwar Japan last recorded male life expectancy below 62 years in 1953 (61.9 years) and below 58 years in 1949 (56.2 years, rising to 58.0 in 1950).[2].

Regarding infant mortality, the former Soviet Union—including Russia (black line in Figure 4)—generally exhibited higher rates than advanced economies but has shown steady convergence toward their levels. As of 2023, Russia's infant mortality rate is not markedly different from those of advanced countries. Nevertheless, Ukraine continues to record relatively elevated infant mortality, underscoring persistent structural vulnerabilities that warrant attention in long-term demographic projections.[3].

3. Population Structures of Russia and Ukraine

The population structures of Russia and Ukraine today embody the cumulative demographic effects of both post-Soviet developments and earlier historical disruptions under the Soviet regime. These effects are clearly visible in the shapes of their population pyramids, which reveal the imprint of major demographic shocks and subsequent recoveries (Kumo, 2011; 2014).

Figures 5a and 6a present the population pyramids for Russia and Ukraine, respectively, at the time of the final Soviet census in 1989, while Figures 5b and 6b depict their structures in 2021, coinciding with Russia's most recent census year. In Figures 5a and 6a, the deep indentations and protrusions correspond to specific historical events—including the Revolution, the famine induced by collectivization, and World War II—that generated sharp declines in fertility and surges in mortality, leading to substantial population losses. These were followed by temporary fertility recoveries during periods of relative stability.

A comparison of Figures 5b (Russia) and 6b (Ukraine) with their 1989 counterparts reveals that, although the overall scale of population has contracted—narrowing the horizontal axes—the characteristic patterns of demographic concavities

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[2] Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan, "Annual Trends in Life Expectancy", https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/life/life09/sankou02.html (accessed June 17, 2025)

[3] Ukraine is the only country for which data is missing, so this chart only shows figures from 1970 onwards. The figures for 2023 are as follows, and Ukraine's infant mortality rate is clearly higher than that of other countries. Russia, on the other hand, is already at a level comparable to other countries: Russia: 3.7; Romania: 5.4; Poland: 3.7; France: 3.4; Netherlands: 3.5; Ukraine: 7.8.

and convexities persist.

Figure 5a. Population Pyramid of Russia, 1989



Figure 5b. Population Pyramid of Russia, 2021



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024), *World Population Prospects 2024*, Online Edition. (accessed June 15, 2025)

Figure 6a. Population Pyramid of Ukraine, 1989



Figure 6b. Population Pyramid of Ukraine, 2021



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024), *World Population Prospects 2024*, Online Edition. (accessed June 15, 2025)

This recurrence reflects a fundamental feature of population dynamics: the cyclical reproduction of demographic patterns through intergenerational mechanisms, typically operating over intervals of 25–30 years. This phenomenon, commonly termed the echo effect, arises when the size of a parental cohort shapes the number of births in the subsequent generation. For instance, Japan's "junior baby boomers," the children of the postwar baby boom generation, exemplify this demographic echo. Similarly, the cohorts born in 1989, visible at the base of Figures 5a and 6a, reached parental age by 2021, thereby reproducing similar patterns of expansion and contraction in Figures 5b and 6b (Vishnevsky, 2009).

In Figures 5b and 6b, two features are particularly noteworthy: the relative bulge in the age group around the mid-30s and the modest expansion of the cohort under age 10. The cohort born around 1992—immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union—entered its late 20s and early 30s by 2021. Following that period, the number of births in both Russia and Ukraine continued to decline, reaching their lowest levels around 2000. This cohort, corresponding to those aged around 20 in 2021, forms the smallest generational segment apart from infants.

Subsequently, a moderate rebound in birth numbers occurred. The children born during Russia's 2007 "Maternity Capital" policy reached approximately age 14 by 2021. However, the earlier rise in births observed among cohorts aged 6–21 in 2021 cannot be fully explained by these pronatalist initiatives. Rather, the principal driver of the temporary birth increase was the expansion of the parental generation itself—specifically, those aged 35–50 in 2021—whose numerical strength naturally led to a greater number of births (Kumo, 2011).

Comparable dynamics are evident in Ukraine. Although Ukraine's pronatalist efforts were more modest in financial scope and lacked institutional continuity, its population pyramid exhibits fluctuations closely paralleling those of Russia. The expansion of the 35–50 age cohort in 2021 corresponds to the relative bulge observed among those aged 10–20, again illustrating the intergenerational echo effect.

Looking forward, however, the implications for future population trends are worrisome. The smallest population cohorts in 2021—those under 23 years of age—will soon reach reproductive age, suggesting an inevitable contraction in both birth numbers and the working-age population over the next two decades. Although Ukraine's State Statistics Service has not released official demographic data since 2021, projections by

Russia's Federal State Statistics Service, published as early as 2014, anticipated a resumption of natural population decline by 2018. Indeed, Russia has experienced renewed natural decrease since 2016, and Ukraine's demographic situation appears even more severe.

Figure 7a. Population Pyramid of Russia, 2024



Figure 7b. Population Pyramid of Ukraine, 2024



Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024), *World Population Prospects 2024*, Online Edition. (accessed June 15, 2025)

Figures 5 and 6 present the pyramids with horizontally expanded axes for ease of visual comparison. To allow direct assessment of population scale, Figures 7a (Russia) and 7b (Ukraine) adjust the axes to equal proportions. The difference in population size is substantial: according to United Nations estimates for 2023, Russia's population stands at 146.45 million, compared to 37.73 million for Ukraine—a ratio of approximately 3.9 to 1.

Naturally, population size alone does not determine national power. For instance, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel successfully engaged Egypt despite facing a tenfold population disadvantage, owing to a GDP per capita approximately ten times higher in U.S. dollar terms. In contrast, according to IMF estimates, Ukraine's 2023 GDP per capita was roughly one-third that of Russia, suggesting that disparities in overall national capacity far exceed those implied by population size alone, even before accounting for differences in resource endowments.

From a demographic and security perspective, the comparison of Figures 7a and 7b is particularly revealing. Russia possesses approximately 9.76 million males of conscription age (18–30 years), whereas Ukraine's corresponding cohort numbers only 2.53 million. Furthermore, Ukraine's fertility decline has been steeper in recent years, and the number of reproductive-age women has decreased substantially. Both the 19–26 and under-8 age cohorts contain fewer than 200,000 individuals per age group, underscoring the acuteness of Ukraine's demographic contraction and its potential long-term implications for population replacement and national resilience.

4. International Migration

As noted earlier, despite persistent natural population decline, Russia has experienced sustained inflows of international migrants, which have substantially mitigated the scale of total population loss. This trend is illustrated in Figure 8. Immediately following the dissolution of the Russian Federation, annual net migration inflows reached between 500,000 and 800,000 persons. Although this figure declined to approximately 200,000 during the 2000s, net inflows began to rise again after 2010. Following the deep "transition recession" of the 1990s, Russia's economy entered a period of recovery and growth from 1999 onward. However, the country simultaneously faced the onset of a decline in its working-age population. The labor force had expanded temporarily in the late 1990s, reflecting the demographic momentum of earlier high-

fertility cohorts, but peaked around 2009 and began to contract rapidly thereafter as a result of the low fertility rates of the post-collapse period. While the government sought to counter these trends by promoting fertility and reducing mortality, the effects of such measures inevitably take two decades or more to materialize. Consequently, to address immediate labor shortages, Russian authorities encouraged both the repatriation of ethnic Russians and the active recruitment of foreign workers.

Figure 8. Russia's International Migration (Resident Registration), 1992–2024.



Source: Rosstat, *Demograficheskii edzhegodnik Rossii*, various years, and Rosstat, *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe polodzhenie Rossii*, January 2025.

In 2006, a presidential decree[4] strengthened state support for the relocation of ethnic Russian diasporas to designated regions in need of labor, though the program remained limited in scope and impact. That same year, amendments to the migration law simplified employment procedures[5] for foreign nationals, particularly easing the entry and residence of visa-free migrants from former Soviet republics., Subsequently, the

[4] Presidential Decree on "Promoting Support for the Voluntary Migration of Compatriots to the Russian Federation" (No. 637 of 22 June 2006).
[5] Regulations on "the Registration of Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation".

introduction of the "labor patent" system in 2010, which provided low-cost work permits,[6] further expanded opportunities for labor migrants (Horie, 2010; Kumo, 2022). Nonetheless, foreign workers also came to serve as a flexible buffer in Russia's labor market—migrant recruitment was curtailed during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis and again following the 2014–2015 sanctions, resulting in temporary contractions of net inflows, as shown in Figure 8.

A conceptual distinction must be drawn between labor migrants and settlers. Labor migrants are typically permitted stays of less than twelve months and are therefore not registered as permanent residents; they are consequently excluded from official migration statistics such as those depicted in Figure 8. However, in 2010, Russia revised the residency definition from twelve months to nine months, which naturally led to an apparent increase in "inflow" figures beginning that year. Simultaneously, as visa-free employment was further liberalized, inflows from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries expanded substantially—a predictable outcome of the policy shift.

Administrative changes also affected migration data in more recent years. Since August 2024, Russia has replaced handwritten immigration documentation with electronically transmitted records. This transition may have resulted in some degree of double-counting or data distortion, producing the pronounced fluctuations observed in the 2022–2024 period. Nevertheless, when interpreted within the broader temporal context, the overall pattern—characterized by an upward trend in international inflows since 2010—remains consistent with long-term demographic and economic dynamics.

In contrast, Ukraine's international migration data present serious limitations. The country has not conducted a national census since 2001, and official publication of demographic statistics ceased in 2021. Consequently, most available figures rely on estimates that carry wide margins of uncertainty. The ongoing conflict has further exacerbated data unreliability by disrupting administrative and statistical systems. It is therefore essential to interpret Ukrainian migration figures with caution and to acknowledge the inherent uncertainty accompanying them.

With these caveats in mind, Figure 9 presents United Nations estimates of Ukraine's international migration trends. For comparative purposes, equivalent data for Russia, derived from the same UN source, are included alongside[7]. Note that the data

[6] Amendment 13.3 to the Law on "the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals" No. 115-FZ.

[7] The figures for Russia's international population flows in Figure 9 differ from those in Figure 8, which

must be approached critically.

Figure 9. International Migration, Russia and Ukraine, 1993-2024

(Table)

	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Russia	723875	550401	263541	307555	384756	334094	314112	765629	27807	-178042
Ukraine	-134053	-67865	-111493	16030	-21992	-4167	-1129	-5699445	-299961	1146012

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024), *World Population Prospects 2024*, Online Edition. (accessed on June 20, 2025)

In the case of Ukraine, even prior to the conflict, instances of net positive migration were notably scarce. Specifically, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and extending through the onset of the Ukraine conflict, net inflows surpassed 100,000 individuals solely in 2006 (at 136,000), with net outflows predominating over the preceding three decades (1993–2021). This pattern corroborates the earlier observation

directly drew upon data from the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation. The most significant discrepancy occurs in 2024, where Figure 8 shows a net inflow of +536,000, while Figure 9 indicates a net outflow of -178,000. The reason for this substantial disparity remains unclear. Some might raise suspicions that Russia is fabricating figures to present a more favourable picture. However, the overall net inflow population is considerably larger in Figure 9 (for 1993–2024, Figure 8 from the Federal State Statistics Service shows +8.16 million, while Figure 9 from the United Nations shows +13.50 million), making such speculation likely unfounded.

of aggregate population declines exceeding those attributable to natural decrease alone.

Subsequent to the initiation of hostilities, the large-scale exodus from Ukraine has been widely documented, albeit with considerable variability in reported magnitudes and destinations, rendering verification challenging. Among the most commonly referenced sources are estimates from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), derived from bidirectional border crossings in neighboring states or Eurostat data on refugees[8]. The United Nations figures illustrated in Figure 9 encapsulate this phenomenon: approximately 5.7 million departures in 2022, followed by 390,000 in 2023, culminating in a total of roughly 6 million over the initial year—equivalent to nearly 20% of the pre-conflict population.

UNHCR estimates indicate that adult females comprise 45% of evacuees, children 31%, and the remaining 24% primarily males aged over 60. Not all female evacuees fall within reproductive age cohorts; a significant proportion likely includes elderly individuals, though granular breakdowns remain unpublished. Nonetheless, United Nations projections estimate 8.71 million females of reproductive age (15–49 years) in Ukraine, refining to 6.95 million for the more demographically active subgroup of 18–45 years. Assuming conservatively that one-quarter of evacuees are reproductive-age females, this equates to approximately 1.5 million individuals, exerting a non-negligible influence on Ukraine's reproductive capacity. Reports indicate that 1.15 million individuals returned to Ukraine in 2024; however, over 5 million remain displaced abroad. The exigencies of wartime conditions inherently suppress fertility rates; moreover, the non-repatriation of reproductive-age females amplifies this effect. While recent contractions in birth rates do not immediately impinge upon the current conflict or economic landscape, they inexorably precipitate long-term challenges in demographic structure and economic sustainability.

Concluding Remarks

As delineated above, neither Russia nor Ukraine exhibits propitious demographic trajectories. Nevertheless, a comparative analysis reveals Russia to occupy a demonstrably superior position relative to Ukraine.

[8] https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine (accessed June 20, 2025)

Both nations manifest underlying natural population declines; however, for instance, Russia's total population decrement since 2020 remains below 1 million. In stark contrast, Ukraine—accounting for evacuees—has experienced a loss of nearly 6 million since 2020, and over 10 million since 2010. Even under the hypothetical scenario of complete repatriation of evacuees, Ukraine's population would still reflect a decline exceeding 4 million from 2010 levels—approximately 9% of the total. Conversely, Russia has realized a net increase of over 3 million since 2010, attributable to migratory inflows.

Russia's annual natural decline approximates 500,000, which is marginally less than Japan's figure of 600,000 since 2020. Given Russia's status as a net recipient of international migrants, its prospective demographic outlook appears substantially more favorable than that of Japan or Ukraine.

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Appendix. Population Statistics Under the War

Official population statistics for the Russian Federation continued to be publicly released until April 2025, after which publication on the website of the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) was suspended. As previously noted, Ukraine has not published demographic data since 2021, rendering a systematic assessment of wartime population dynamics exceedingly difficult. In the absence of official data, various research institutions and media outlets have produced their own estimates, though their methodologies and reliability vary considerably.

A historical precedent for the wartime disruption of demographic reporting can be found in population statistics from the Great Patriotic War, preserved in the archives of the Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE). Tables A1 and A2 present 1942 population data for Stalingrad Oblast and Rostov Oblast, respectively. In Stalingrad Oblast, population reporting ceased after June 1942, and in Rostov Oblast after May 1942. Although the Battle of Stalingrad concluded in January 1943, the rapid and unstable shifts of the front lines rendered the compilation of accurate demographic statistics virtually impossible. Even during periods when certain civil registration offices (ZAGS) were operational—such as in Rostov between January and April 1942—coverage was highly incomplete, as shown in columns 2–3 of Table A2. Comparable disruptions occurred elsewhere: for instance, in Tula Oblast at the beginning of 1942 (data not shown), only 491 of the 1,214 ZAGS offices functioned in January. These examples illustrate the inherent impossibility of maintaining comprehensive vital statistics under wartime conditions.

A similar pattern has emerged in the context of the current conflict. Since May 2025, Rosstat has discontinued the publication of monthly population statistics. Traditionally, the agency's monthly bulletin Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii (The Socio-economic Situation of Russia) has included a section entitled "Demography," reporting births, deaths, infant mortality, marriages, divorces, and both internal and international migration (see Figure A1, right panel). However, beginning with the May 2025 issue, this section was omitted entirely, and the June 2025 issue followed the same pattern (Figure A2).

Japanese media have interpreted this suspension in a strongly critical light. For instance, the Nikkei article dated 15 August 2025, entitled "Russia Halts Monthly

Population Statistics Publication: Hiding Wartime Decline? Pronatalist Measures Ineffective," reported:

> [Moscow = Tomoyo Ogawa] Russia is successively halting the publication of population statistics. Monthly data such as births and deaths are no longer updated, apparently in an attempt to suppress information revealing wartime population decline and to conceal the ineffectiveness of pronatalist policies. The protracted invasion of Ukraine is accelerating Russia's demographic crisis. If objective assessment of population dynamics—fundamental for policymaking—becomes impossible, responses to low fertility and population ageing may be further delayed.

While factually accurate regarding the cessation of publication, such commentary should be regarded as markedly biased. As repeatedly emphasized, Ukraine's State Statistics Service has not released any data on births, deaths, or migration since 2021. To ignore this fact while denouncing Russia's suspension beginning in May 2025 is analytically inconsistent. The Nikkei article, though grounded in verified information, thus represents what may be termed sophisticated propaganda—a factually correct narrative strategically framed to promote a particular interpretive stance.

Nevertheless, the cessation of regular publication in wartime Russia, even after maintaining transparency through April 2025, reflects the extreme challenges of demographic reporting under active conflict conditions. In regions such as Kursk and Belgorod oblasts—both subject to cross-border incursions—data collection likely became as infeasible as it was in Stalingrad or Rostov during 1942.

Indeed, Rosstat's April 2025 issue of Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii explicitly acknowledges reliance only on data "available for reporting." For the first quarter of 2025, both births and deaths were recorded as lower than in 2024; however, the figures were based on reports from 70 federal subjects for births and only 55 for deaths (p. 229). Such documentation, while incomplete, must be recognized as an instance of considerable administrative candor under severe wartime constraints.

Table A1. 1942 Births, Deaths, Infant Deaths, Marriages, Divorces (Rates) in Stalingrad Oblast.



Сведения о естественном движении населения по республикам, краям и областям за 1942 г.

Наименование республики, края, области Сталинградская область

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Месяцы	Общее число загсо-меся-цев	Объем представленных данных в загсо-месяцах	% охвата загсов учетом	Население по переписи 1939 г.	Население по загсам представ. сведения	% населения охваченного учетом	Число загсов не представивших сведения	Абсолютные величины. Отчетные данные: Рождений	Умерших всего	Разность между числом рождений и умерших	Умерших до 1 года	Браков	Разводов	На 1000 населения: Родилось	Умерло	Разность между числом рождений и умерших	Браков	Разводов	На 1000 родивш. умерших в возрасте до 1 года
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Январь	1143	1143	100,0	2416.0	2416.0	100.0	–	6903	5186	1717	1032	721	125						
Февраль	1143	1061		2416.0	2276.6		82	5795	5040	755	1009	605	145						
Итого за 2 мес.																			
Март	1143	1143	100,0	2416,0	2416,0	100,0	–	6817	5785		1239	507	107						
Итого за 3 мес.																			
Апрель	1143	1143	100.0	2416.0	2416.0	100.0		5469	6081	-612	1139	507	129						
Итого за 4 мес.																			
Май	1144	1144	100,0	2417.9	2417.9	100,0	–	4582	5289		1167	543	126						
Итого за 5 м-цев																			
Июнь	1144	1132		24[illegible],9	2404,9		12	3810	5831	-2021	(1774) 1776	471	145						
Итого за 6 м-цев																			
Июль																			
Итого за 7 м-цев																			
Август																			
Итого за 8 м-цев																			
Сентябрь																			
Итого за 9 м-цев																			
Октябрь																			
Итого за 10 м-цев																			
Ноябрь																			
Итого за 11 м-цев																			
Декабрь																			
Итого за год																			

Source: RGAE, F.1562, O.20, D.341, L.116.

Table A2. 1942 Births, Deaths, Infant Deaths, Marriages, Divorces (Rates) in Rostov Oblast.

Сведения о естественном движении населения по республикам, краям и областям за 1942 г. 113

Наименование республики, края, области ... Ростовская область ....

Месяцы	Общее число загсо-меся-цев	Об'ем пред'ставлен. данных в загсо-месяцах	% охвата загс'ов учетом	Население по переписи 1939 г.	Население по загсам представ. сведения	% насел. охвачен. учетом	Число загсов не предоставивших сведения	Абсолютные величины. Отчетные данные: Рождений	Умерших всего	Разность между числом рожден. и умерш.	Умерших до 1 года	Браков	Разводов	На 1000 населения: Рождения	Умерло	Разность между числом рождений и умерш.	Браков	Разводов	На 1000 рождений умерших в возрасте до 1 года
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Январь	638	539		2893,2			99	5440	2545	2895	358	412	51						
Февраль	632	524					108	5787	2641	2846	429	407	76						
Итого за 2 мес.																			
Март																			
Итого за 3 мес.																			
Апрель	632	603		...	...		29	4818	2927	1891	667	378	81						
Итого за 4 мес.																			
Май	632	616 св. нет		св. нет				4468	2795		623	501	92						
Итого за 5 м-цев																			
Июнь																			
Итого за 6 м-цев																			
Июль																			
Итого за 7 м-цев																			
Август																			
Итого за 8 м-цев																			
Сентябрь																			
Итого за 9 м-цев																			
Октябрь																			
Итого за 10 м-цев																			
Ноябрь																			
Итого за 11 м-цев																			
Декабрь																			
Итого за год																			

Source: RGAE, F.1562, O.20, D.341, L.125.

Figure A1. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii, April 2025 Issue.



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Москва



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Figure A2. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii, May 2025 Issue.



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

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