

Day 1 (Feb 8)

1. Norihito Sakamoto “A Class of Practical and Acceptable Social Welfare Orderings That Satisfy the Principles of Aggregation and Non-Aggregation: Reexamination of the Tyrannies of Aggregation and Non-Aggregation”

Abstract. This paper revisits impossibility results on the tyrannies of aggregation and nonaggregation. I propose two aggregation principles --quantitative aggregation and ratio aggregation—and investigate theoretical implications. As a result, I show that quantitative aggregation and minimal non-aggregation are incompatible while ratio aggregation and minimal non-aggregation are compatible under the assumption of standard axioms in social choice theory. Furthermore, this study provides a new characterization of the leximin rule by using replication invariance and the strong version of non-aggregation. Finally, I propose a class of practical and acceptable social welfare orderings that satisfy the principles of aggregation and non-aggregation, which has various advantages over the standard rank-discounted generalized utilitarianism.

2. John A. Weymark (with E. Karni) “Impartiality and Relative Utilitarianism”

Abstract. A novel axiomatization of relative utilitarianism is provided using the single-profile setting used in Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem. Harsanyi's axioms are supplemented with an impartiality axiom that requires social alternative lotteries p and q to be socially indifferent when (i) two individuals have conflicting preferences for them and everybody else is indifferent and (ii) the concerned individuals' strengths of preference for p over q have the same magnitude. This axiomatization shows that equality of the social weights can be obtained in a single-profile setting and that no interprofile condition is needed to obtain profile-independent weights in a multi-profile setting.

3. Walter Bossert (with S. Cato and K. Kamaga) “Population Ethics with a Threshold”

Abstract. The literature on population ethics with incomplete goodness relations has, so far, primarily focused on quasi-orderings that can be expressed by means of a critical band. We propose a more general approach that is based on thresholds. Our principles declare one population better than another if the difference between their respective critical-level utilitarian values is greater than, or

greater than or equal to, a positive threshold. This threshold is a function of the difference in population sizes. The class of critical-band utilitarian principles that use closed or open intervals emerges as the special case that is obtained if the threshold function is increasing and linear. A second special case consists of the class of principles that correspond to a fixed threshold---that is, a constant threshold function. We characterize the general class of threshold principles as well as the two special case just alluded to.

4. Kan Takeuchi (with N. Ukishima) “On the Intuition-Free Modeling of Human Decision-Makings”

Abstract. Many decision-making models such as Expected Utility and Prospect Theory incorporate variables that are mathematically coherent and intuitively reasonable, yet they are not free from the influence of their designers' discretion. While the models are mathematically and intuitively appealing, they often reflect the biases inherent in human judgment. This paper presents a machine learning feature engineering framework with an evolutionary selection process to objectively construct pivotal variables in decision-making models. This approach aims to reduce personal bias and the reliance on intuition. Our findings suggest that variables indicative of pessimism are significant in predicting decision-making behaviors, and the importance of these variables still varies with the specifics of each problem.

5. Ryo Kambayashi (with R. Gotoh) “An Empirical Challenge of Capability Approach and Philosophy”

Abstract. In this paper, we explore statistically and normatively well-grounded methods for measuring a capability set. We focus on its curvature as the statistical association between the achievements of functionings and the activity actually chosen by an individual. According to Sen (1980, 1985, 1999), if an individual can achieve a certain level of functionings regardless of the activity actually chosen, we can say that the person has a freedom as a whole (well-being freedom and agency freedom). The empirical challenge here is that: since we usually do not observe the achievement of activity when the person does not choose it, how should we estimate unfreedom and the size of an individual's capability? We examine a method to measure an individual's capability by aggregating individuals' functionings among a type (a ratio of chosen/not-chosen) and aggregating type's functionings among a group.

6. Marc Fleurbaey (with J. K. Hammitt) “The Right Numeraire or the Just Weights? How to make BCA Rational and Fair”

Abstract. Unweighted benefit-cost analysis (BCA) based on aggregate willingness to pay might be, at long last, falling into disrepute, as it is widely recognized that it exhibits a bias toward the wealthy, and as alternatives are appearing more and more practicable. But the choice of alternatives is often framed in terms of choosing an alternative metric to willingness to pay in money, such as willingness to pay in healthy life years, or a measure of subjective well-being. It is argued in this paper that 1) a simple summation of individuals' willingness to pay in any numeraire (e.g., money, healthy life years) is bound to generate non-transitivity issues in a similar way as money-based BCA, and 2) a metric such as subjective well-being involves distributional value judgments that are too specific to reflect the relevant spectrum in the public debate. The “orthodox” weighted BCA method, which links BCA to an underlying social welfare function, offers more flexibility and guarantees transitive choices. Fortunately, in some relevant cases, these various methods may provide similar results, and the main options currently proposed all give greater weight to the worse off in the population than does unweighted BCA

7. Alex Voorhoeve (with V. Luptakova) “Balancing Death against Lesser Burdens: Philosophy, Psychology and Policy”

Abstract. Health policy-makers have to make difficult decisions about who to prioritize for care. The most commonly used principles for priority setting take one of two forms: either they tell policy-makers to maximize total health-related well-being in their population, or they tell them to improve overall population health while assigning somewhat more weight to improvements in the health of the worse off. Many philosophers have objected that such standard principles counterintuitively allow one person's very severe burden, such as an early death, to be outweighed by a multitude of minor burdens, such as toenail fungus. There is, however, little evidence of the public's views. I present novel survey evidence which suggests that a large share of people indeed do not think that death can be outweighed by a multitude of minor burdens. I argue that these findings suggest that the most commonly used priority-setting principles may lack legitimacy, and that alternative principles that limit the degree to which death can be outweighed by lesser burdens may be superior, because they have a reasonable basis and are more widely supported by the public.

Day 2 (Feb 9)

8. Yongsheng Xu (with P. K. Pattanaik) “Top-Bottom Dominance and Possibility of Making Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being in the Functioning and Capability Approach”

Abstract. We discuss the issue of making interpersonal comparisons of individual well-being in the functioning and capability approach (FCA). A conventional method of making interpersonal comparisons of individual well-being in the FCA is to invoke a dominance principle (Sen, 1987), which basically says that if a functioning bundle x is “bigger” than another functioning bundle y , then the well-being of any individual achieving the bundle x should be higher than the well-being of any individual achieving the bundle y . It has been shown in the literature (Pattanaik and Xu (2007, 2012, 2023/2024)) that this dominance principle runs into difficulty with an attempt of accommodating the diversity of individual values in a society even in a very moderate fashion. Faced with this difficulty, we introduce a weaker version of the dominance principle, to be called top-bottom dominance, and show that the possibility of making some interpersonal comparisons of individual well-being based on top-bottom dominance while respecting different values of individuals in the society emerges. The idea underlying top-bottom dominance is that, if an individual is “very well-off” in the sense of having very high achievement in every dimension, and another individual is “very badly-off” in the sense of having very low achievement in every dimension, then the well-being of a “very well-off” individual should be higher than the well-being of a “very badly-off” individual.

9. Satoshi Nakada (with N. Sakamoto) “Multi-Threshold Generalized Sufficiency and Level-Oligarchy”

Abstract. This paper investigates a class of acceptable social welfare orderings that satisfy the standard axioms in the literature: anonymity, strong Pareto, separability, and Pigou-Dalton transfer (or, convexity). Due to the lack of continuity, we show that the class of social orderings typically has some thresholds satisfying the following property, which we call level-oligarchy: individuals whose utility is less than the value are absolutely prioritized over the other individuals whose utility is greater than the value. First, we provide the novel reduced form characterization that a social welfare ordering satisfies anonymity, strong Pareto, separability, and convexity only if it is either the weak generalized utilitarian or level-oligarchy. Next, by dropping convexity and instead requiring Pigou-Dalton transfer and a mild continuity axiom, we characterize the new class of social welfare orderings, the multi-

threshold generalized sufficientarian orderings, which subsumes the leximin, generalized utilitarian, and critical-level sufficientarian social welfare orderings as special cases. Therefore, we can provide a unified characterization for the important class of social orderings only by the acceptable axioms. In particular, although the social judgment from both classes of orderings seems quite different, our result implies that the difference between the utilitarian and leximin orderings just comes from the degree of continuity.

10. Akira Inoue “Relational Egalitarians Should Sever the Close Relationship with Neo-Republicanism: On Intergenerational Justice”

Abstract. Relational egalitarians define equality in relational terms. Relational egalitarians agree that republican non-domination is a necessary property of an intrinsic kind for relational egalitarianism, even though they have different views about the conditions for relational egalitarianism (e.g., about what are the most relevant political and economic goods, about how inequality in those goods is unjust, and so on). This can be called the “relational egalitarian-republican thesis”. This paper shows that relational egalitarianism, insofar as it incorporates the relational egalitarian-republican thesis, has difficulty dealing with the problems of intergenerational justice. To say the least, it is not on a par with other theories of justice in terms of the difficulty of supporting its principle(s) across non-overlapping generations. I thus suggest that relational egalitarianism should abandon the thesis in question in order to pursue a plausible conception of relational egalitarianism that can reasonably hold across generations.

11. Biung-Ghi Ju (with I. Jang) “Priority, Solidarity, and Egalitarianism in the Capability Approach”

Abstract. This paper examines resource allocation in the context of the capability approach with multi-dimensional human functioning outputs. We aim to set clear guidelines of using human development indices (HDIs) based on Parfit's (1997) priority principle that when a person becomes more disabled, *ceteris paribus*, he should receive more resources. An HDI-egalitarian rule allocates resources in such a way that all individuals attain an equal HDI-index value. Using the priority principle or its variant, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the whole family of HDI-egalitarian rules, the weighted arithmetic mean HDI-egalitarian rules and the weighted geometric mean HDI-egalitarian rules.

12. Susumu Cato (with M. Fleurbaey) “Fair Social Quasi-Orderings”

Abstract. This paper develops fair quasi-orderings, which are incomplete but consistent judgments over the set of allocations. One of the most popular quasi-orderings is the Paretian dominance relation, which has no concern about fairness. To settle down a conflict of interests between individuals, the Bergson-Samuelson orderings are commonly used, as they care about fairness. Such social orderings include strong value judgments, which might not be normatively plausible. In this study, we propose two fair social quasi-orderings: the social nested-contour quasi-ordering and the pairwise nested-contour quasi-ordering. The two quasi-orderings are in between the Paretian and the Bergson-Samuelson approaches. They can be regarded as dominance criteria over multiple attributes: they employ lower contour sets of individuals (or their intersection) and apply set inclusion to compare allocations. The canonical dominance approach over multiple attributes assumes the homogeneity of individual preferences, which makes interpersonal comparison easy. We allow individual preferences to be heterogeneous.

13. Orri Stefansson (with J. M. Nebel) “Calibration Dilemmas in Distributive Ethics: Some Potential Responses”

Abstract. This paper presents a new kind of problem in the ethics of distribution. The problem takes the form of several ‘calibration dilemmas’, in which intuitively reasonable aversion to small-stakes inequalities requires leading theories of distribution to recommend intuitively unreasonable aversion to large-stakes inequalities. We first lay out a series of such dilemmas for prioritarian theories. We then consider a widely endorsed family of egalitarian views and show that they are subject to even more forceful calibration dilemmas than prioritarian theories. Finally, we show that our results challenge common utilitarian accounts of the badness of inequalities in resources.