Supply elasticity of housing market in Japan

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Motivation

- Local housing plays an integral role in the welfare of residents.
- Supply elasticities in the local housing market determine the evolution of housing prices and urban development, thus affecting residents' welfare.
- Saiz (2010) estimates the housing supply elasticity with considering two key determinants:
 - Share of undevelopable land area.
 - Land use regulations.
- The estimated elasticity that is heterogeneous across MSAs in the US has been used in a massive number of academic articles in many fields.
 - Number of articles citing Saiz (2010): 928 (in Google Scholars) 224 (Web of Science).

Notable applications of Saiz (2010) housing supply elasticity

- Banking deregulation on housing price and stocks (Favara and Imbs, 2015, AER).
- Homeowner borrowing responded to the increase of house price on default. (Mian and Sufi, 2011, AER).
- Impact of 2006-9 housing collapse on consumption (Mian, Rao and Sufi, 2013, QJE).
- Impact of a reduction in housing net worth on decline in employment (Mian and Sufi, 2014, ECMA).
- Impact of house price on fertility rates (Dettling and Kearney, 2014, JPubE).
- Metropolitan-level housing supply elasticity is essential infrastructure of research in many fields of economics, especially finance and real estate.

Motivation

- To the authors' knowledge, there is still a limited number of studies that consider geographical constraints and regulations and measure region-specific housing supply elasticities.
 - Saiz (2010 QJE, US), Hilber and Vermeulen (2016 EJ, England).
- There is still no estimate of housing supply elasticity in Japan.
 - Actually, many papers focusing Japanese housing market are rejected due to the lack of the measure.
- Furthermore, Japan has scarce land spaces.
 - Many cities are facing on coasts and mountains.
- This geographic feature may cause inelastic housing supply in Japanese cities.
 - Housing supply elasticities (housing price responses to demand shocks) may be substantially lower (higher) in Japan than in the US.

Terrain in the US



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Terrain in Japan



Terrain in Japan



Terrain in Japan



An example | Kochi city



An example | Kochi city



Kochi city with 50 km radius circle



Motivation

- In the past, three different phases in the real estate market in Japan. The housing supply elasticities might be different in phases.
 - I. Pre-bubble period (-1985).
 - 2. Period of a rapid run-up of real estate prices (from latter half of 1980s to early 1990s).
 - 3. After the bubble burst (from early 1990s up to now).

What we do in this project

- Provide the measure of housing supply elasticity with considering geographical constraint in Japan.
- Preview of the results:
 - Share of undevelopable land also significantly increases the inverse housing supply elasticities in Japan.
 - Housing prices in metropolitan areas with large undevelopable land respond to demand shock more than in others.
 - Housing supply elasticities (housing price responses to demand shocks) are substantially lower (higher) in Japan than in the US.
 - Pre-bubble (high-economic growth) periods has the largest inverse housing supply elasticities.
 - Heterogeneous impact of undevelopable lands:
 - It significantly works with the growth of housing demands.

Concept of the analysis

• Conceptually, we estimate the following inverse housing supply function,

- By estimating response of long difference of housing price, ΔlnP_k , on the difference of housing stock, ΔlnH_k , that is driven by housing demand shocks, we are able to estimate the inverse of housing supply elasticity, β_k^s .
- β_k^s is city-specific.
 - We discuss on the determinants that cause the city-specific difference of the elasticity.

Model and Proposition by Saiz (2010)

- A monocentric city model with the following features
 - Consumers with homogeneous preferences for housing, amenities, and private consumptions.
 - Price-taking developers.
 - A circular city with radius: Φ_k .
 - Share of developable land: Λ_k .
 - Number of housing units in the city: H_k .
- The city-specific inverse elasticity of supply $\beta_k^s = \frac{\partial \ln P_k}{\partial \ln H_k} = \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{\frac{1}{3i}t(\sqrt{\frac{\gamma H_k}{\Lambda_k \pi}})}{P_L} \right].$
 - The city-specific inverse elasticity of supply is decreasing in land availability Λ_k .
 - As land constrains increase, positive demand shocks imply stronger positive impacts on the growth of housing values.

Estimation equation

• The proposition induces the following housing supply function.

• $\beta^{S} > 0$, $\beta^{LAND} > 0$ is expected.

Estimation issues

- Definition of metropolitan areas.
- Calculation of undevelopable land at the metropolitan area level.
- Construction of variables on
 - Land prices and housing stock.
 - Land use regulations.
- Instruments:
 - To estimate supply function, we need demand shock as IV.
- Other variables.

Urban Employment Area

- Proposed by Kanemoto and Tokuoka (2002)
 - Provided by CSIS, the U. of Tokyo.
- A UEA is constructed by the combinations of municipalities based on commuting flows.
- We use 2010 version as the definition of city in the analysis.
 - There are 108 UEAs in Japan.

Calculation of undevelopable land

- Following to Saiz (2010),
 - We consider 50 km radius from central city in each UEA as the potential range of a metropolitan area.
 - We exclude grids (with the size of 250m×250m) whose average slope exceeds 15 percent.
 - We exclude areas with water (ocean, river, lake, pond,..).
- Topography information: 250m ×250m grid data from Geographical Information Authority of Japan in 2009.
- Wetland information: I km × I km grid data from Geographical Information Authority of Japan in 2014.

Discussion on living in steep areas

- Saiz (2010) sets the threshold of 15% slope (equivalent to 8.53 degrees in angle) for the land that is too steep for people to live in.
- In a 50km radius of Los Angeles city centroid, there are 6456 census block groups.
- In these groups, 47.62% have a steep-sloped terrain (i.e. more than half of its subareas (90m×90m grid) have the average slope of above 15%).
- But population share of such groups with steep-sloped terrain is only 3.65%.
- How about in Japan? Do people mind living in steep areas in a country covered with mountains?

Discussion on living in steep areas

• The Japanese do not live in steep areas, either

Number of areas (250x250 meter square) for different average slope in angles (x) and for different numbers of residents (y) x: average angle in the area, y: number of residents

									Accumulated	Accumulated
	v=0	0 <v<=5< td=""><td>5<v<=20< td=""><td>20<v<=50< td=""><td>50<v<=100< td=""><td>100<v<=300< td=""><td>300<v< td=""><td>Total</td><td>share in the</td><td>share in the</td></v<></td></v<=300<></td></v<=100<></td></v<=50<></td></v<=20<></td></v<=5<>	5 <v<=20< td=""><td>20<v<=50< td=""><td>50<v<=100< td=""><td>100<v<=300< td=""><td>300<v< td=""><td>Total</td><td>share in the</td><td>share in the</td></v<></td></v<=300<></td></v<=100<></td></v<=50<></td></v<=20<>	20 <v<=50< td=""><td>50<v<=100< td=""><td>100<v<=300< td=""><td>300<v< td=""><td>Total</td><td>share in the</td><td>share in the</td></v<></td></v<=300<></td></v<=100<></td></v<=50<>	50 <v<=100< td=""><td>100<v<=300< td=""><td>300<v< td=""><td>Total</td><td>share in the</td><td>share in the</td></v<></td></v<=300<></td></v<=100<>	100 <v<=300< td=""><td>300<v< td=""><td>Total</td><td>share in the</td><td>share in the</td></v<></td></v<=300<>	300 <v< td=""><td>Total</td><td>share in the</td><td>share in the</td></v<>	Total	share in the	share in the
	y-0	0 1 y 1 - 5	5 y x=20	20 \y \= 30	50 \y \=100	100 (y <= 500	500 vy	local	number of	entire
									areas	population
x<=0.5	427,399	6,571	13,368	15,477	14,651	26,862	42,060	546,388	100.0000%	100.0000%
0.5 <x<=1< td=""><td>164,548</td><td>1,997</td><td>4,229</td><td>4,896</td><td>4,216</td><td>7,481</td><td>10,820</td><td>198,187</td><td>91.0565%</td><td>54.1395%</td></x<=1<>	164,548	1,997	4,229	4,896	4,216	7,481	10,820	198,187	91.0565%	54.1395%
1 <x<=5< td=""><td>586,979</td><td>6,077</td><td>13,406</td><td>14,631</td><td>11,748</td><td>17,998</td><td>26,237</td><td>677,076</td><td>87.8125%</td><td>42.0326%</td></x<=5<>	586,979	6,077	13,406	14,631	11,748	17,998	26,237	677,076	87.8125%	42.0326%
5 <x<=10< td=""><td>723,025</td><td>7,019</td><td>13,376</td><td>9,729</td><td>5,718</td><td>7,199</td><td>6,430</td><td>772,496</td><td>76.7299%</td><td>12.3096%</td></x<=10<>	723,025	7,019	13,376	9,729	5,718	7,199	6,430	772,496	76.7299%	12.3096%
10 <x<=15< td=""><td>896,916</td><td>6,790</td><td>9,878</td><td>5,322</td><td>2,362</td><td>2,326</td><td>915</td><td>924,509</td><td>64.0854%</td><td>3.1967%</td></x<=15<>	896,916	6,790	9,878	5,322	2,362	2,326	915	924,509	64.0854%	3.1967%
15 <x<=20< td=""><td>903,101</td><td>4,516</td><td>5,433</td><td>2,270</td><td>837</td><td>694</td><td>130</td><td>916,981</td><td>48.9527%</td><td>0.8789%</td></x<=20<>	903,101	4,516	5,433	2,270	837	694	130	916,981	48.9527%	0.8789%
20 <x<=22< td=""><td>336,047</td><td>1,150</td><td>1,208</td><td>365</td><td>118</td><td>62</td><td>9</td><td>338,959</td><td>33.9432%</td><td>0.1880%</td></x<=22<>	336,047	1,150	1,208	365	118	62	9	338,959	33.9432%	0.1880%
22 <x<=24< td=""><td>318,240</td><td>831</td><td>715</td><td>209</td><td>76</td><td>27</td><td>2</td><td>320,100</td><td>28.3950%</td><td>0.0962%</td></x<=24<>	318,240	831	715	209	76	27	2	320,100	28.3950%	0.0962%
24 <x<=26< td=""><td>297,053</td><td>568</td><td>448</td><td>106</td><td>25</td><td>15</td><td>1</td><td>298,216</td><td>23.1555%</td><td>0.0467%</td></x<=26<>	297,053	568	448	106	25	15	1	298,216	23.1555%	0.0467%
26 <x<=28< td=""><td>265,571</td><td>318</td><td>255</td><td>45</td><td>13</td><td>3</td><td>0</td><td>266,205</td><td>18.2742%</td><td>0.0206%</td></x<=28<>	265,571	318	255	45	13	3	0	266,205	18.2742%	0.0206%
28 <x<=30< td=""><td>223,162</td><td>182</td><td>118</td><td>23</td><td>4</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>223,490</td><td>13.9168%</td><td>0.0090%</td></x<=30<>	223,162	182	118	23	4	1	0	223,490	13.9168%	0.0090%
30 <x<=32< td=""><td>174,100</td><td>90</td><td>74</td><td>6</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>174,271</td><td>10.2587%</td><td>0.0037%</td></x<=32<>	174,100	90	74	6	1	0	0	174,271	10.2587%	0.0037%
32 <x<=34< td=""><td>121,691</td><td>40</td><td>29</td><td>0</td><td>2</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>121,762</td><td>7.4061%</td><td>0.0014%</td></x<=34<>	121,691	40	29	0	2	0	0	121,762	7.4061%	0.0014%
34 <x<=36< td=""><td>75,533</td><td>23</td><td>6</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>75,562</td><td>5.4131%</td><td>0.0004%</td></x<=36<>	75,533	23	6	0	0	0	0	75,562	5.4131%	0.0004%
36 <x< td=""><td>255,123</td><td>16</td><td>3</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>255,143</td><td>4.1763%</td><td>0.0002%</td></x<>	255,123	16	3	1	0	0	0	255,143	4.1763%	0.0002%
Total	5,768,488	36,188	62,546	53,080	39,771	62,668	86,604	6,109,345		

The areas whose average angle is above 10 degrees: the share in the number of areas is 64.1%, while the share in population is only 3.2%

Note: For calculating the number of residents in each cell, we use the central value (e.g. for the category of 0<y<=5, we employ 2.5). We use the value of 500 for the category of 300<y.

Rank	UEA	Undevelopable land share	R	ank UEA	Undevelopable land share
	l Kochi		0.947	3 lse	0.827
	2Nobeoka		0.947	32Sakata	0.826
	3Naha-Urasoe		0.929	33Numazu	0.821
	4Tottori		0.928	34Fukuyama	0.820
	5Matsuyama		0.927	35Kofu	0.820
	6Maizuru		0.916	36Fuji	0.820
	70kinawa		0.912	37Kanazawa	0.815
	8Niihama		0.909	38Matsumoto	0.808
	91wakuni-Otake		0.906	39Hamamatsu	0.805
	10Hakodate		0.904	40Toyama-Takaoka	0.804
	l I Nagasaki		0.900	4 I Ube	0.804
	12Shunan		0.896	42Nagano	0.799
	13Matsue		0.895	43 Yatsushiro	0.794
	14Tokushima		0.890	44Himeji	0.794
	15Muroran		0.885	45 Akita	0.786
	16Hiroshima		0.879	46Morioka	0.777
	17Imabari		0.878	47Hitachi	0.775
	l 8Fukui		0.877	48Takamatsu	0.774
	19Yonago		0.874	49Nagaoka	0.773
	20Kure		0.866	50Niigata	0.772
	2 I Yamaguchi		0.865	5 I Shimonoseki	0.770
	22Joetsu		0.862	52Kitakyushu	0.768
	23Sasebo		0.861	530kayama	0.767
	24Iwaki		0.856	54Ueda	0.763
	25Shimada		0.854	55Aizuwakamatsu	0.762
	26Shizuoka		0.853	56Yamagata	0.744
	270ita		0.851	57Sanjo-Tsubame	0.744
	28Wakayama		0.849	58Kagoshima	0.743
	29Tsuruoka		0.846	59Miyakonojo	22 0.736
	30Miyazaki		0.835	60Hirosaki	0.735

Rank	UEA	Undevelopable land share	Rank	UEA	Undevelopable land share	
	61 Hachinohe	(0.729	91 Anjo	C).570
	62Toyohashi	(0.729	92Chitose	C).569
	63Kumamoto	(0.712	93Mito	C).568
	64 lizuka	(0.708	94Hekinan	C).564
	65 Ishinomaki	(0.704	95 Toyota	C).560
	66 Kushiro	(0.696	96Handa	C).536
	67Gamagori	(D.69 I	97 Kariya	C).520
	68Aomori	(0.690	98Obihiro	C).507
	69Fukushima	(D.688	99 Nagoya-Komaki	C).498
	70Fukuoka	(Э.686	100Utsunomiya	C).472
	71 Koriyama	(0.684	101 Yokkaichi	C).465
	72Kitami	(0.683	1020ta-Oizumi	C).430
	73Tomakomai	(0.667	103Tochigi	C).347
	74Tsu	(0.667	104 Narita	C).320
	75 Maebashi-Takasaki-Isesal	<i (<="" td=""><td>0.665</td><td>1050yama</td><td>C</td><td>).281</td></i>	0.665	1050yama	C).281
	76Saga	(0.654	106Tokyo	C).224
	77Sendai	(0.653	107Koga	C).201
	78Asahikawa	(0.652	108Tsukuba-Tsuchiura	C).146
	79Hikone	(0.641			
	80Kurume	(0.639			
	8 Kobe	(D.63 I			
	820muta	(D.63 I			
	83Kyoto	(0.625			
	84Gifu	(0.623			
	85 Nishio	(0.621			
	86Okazaki	(0.616			
	87Iwamizawa	(0.608			
	88Osaka	(0.597			
	89Ogaki	(0.594		23	
	90Sapporo-Otaru	(0.581			

US case from Saiz (2010)

		Undevelopable				Undevelopable	
Rank	MSA/NECMA name	area (%)	WRI	Rank	MSA/NECMA name	area (%)	WRI
1	Ventura, CA	79.64	1.21	26	Portland–Vancouver, OR–WA	37.54	0.27
2	Miami, FL	76.63	0.94	27	Tacoma, WA	36.69	1.34
3	Fort Lauderdale, FL	75.71	0.72	28	Orlando, FL	36.13	0.32
4	New Orleans, LA	74.89	-1.24	29	Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH	33.90	1.70
5	San Francisco, CA	73.14	0.72	30	Jersey City, NJ	33.80	0.29
6	Salt Lake City–Ogden, UT	71.99	-0.03	31	Baton Rouge, LA	33.52	-0.81
7	Sarasota–Bradenton, FL	66.63	0.92	32	Las Vegas, NV–AZ	32.07	-0.69
8	West Palm Beach–Boca Raton, FL	64.01	0.31	33	Gary, IN	31.53	-0.69
9	San Jose, CA	63.80	0.21	34	Newark, NJ	30.50	0.68
10	San Diego, CA	63.41	0.46	35	Rochester, NY	30.46	-0.06
11	Oakland, CA	61.67	0.62	36	Pittsburgh, PA	30.02	0.10
12	Charleston–North Charleston, SC	60.45	-0.81	37	Mobile, AL	29.32	-1.00
13	Norfolk–Virginia Beach–Newport News, VA–NC	59.77	0.12	38	Scranton–Wilkes-Barre–Hazleton, PA	28.78	0.01
14	Los Angeles–Long Beach, CA	52.47	0.49	39	Springfield, MA	27.08	0.72
15	Vallejo–Fairfield–Napa, CA	49.16	0.96	40	Detroit, MI	24.52	0.05
16	Jacksonville, FL	47.33	-0.02	41	Bakersfield, CA	24.21	0.40
17	New Haven–Bridgeport–Stamford, CT	45.01	0.19	42	Harrisburg–Lebanon–Carlisle, PA	24.02	0.54
18	Seattle–Bellevue–Everett, WA	43.63	0.92	43	Albany–Schenectady–Troy, NY	23.33	-0.09
19	Milwaukee–Waukesha, WI	41.78	0.46	44	Hartford, CT	23.29	0.49
20	Tampa–St. Petersburg–Clearwater, FL	41.64	-0.22	45	Tucson, AZ	23.07	1.52
21	Cleveland–Lorain–Elyria, OH	40.50	-0.16	46	Colorado Springs, CO	22.27	0.87
22	New York, NY	40.42	0.65	47	Baltimore, MD	21.87	1.60
23	Chicago, IL	40.01	0.02	48	Allentown–Bethlehem–Easton, PA	20.86	0.02
24	Knoxville, TN	38.53	-0.37	49	Minneapolis–St. Paul, MN–WI	19.23	0.38
25	Riverside–San Bernardino, CA	37.90	0.53	50	Buffalo–Niagara Falls, NY	19.05	-0.23

 $\begin{tabular}{l} TABLE \ I \\ Physical and Regulatory Development Constraints (Metro Areas with Population > 500,000) \\ \end{tabular}$

US case from Saiz (2010)

TABLE I

(CONTINUED)

		Undevelopabl	e			Undevelopabl	e
Rank	MSA/NECMA name	area (%)	WRI	Rank	MSA/NECMA name	area (%)	WRI
51	Toledo, OH	18.96	-0.57	74	Dallas, TX	9.16	-0.23
52	Syracuse, NY	17.85	-0.59	75	Richmond–Petersburg, VA	8.81	-0.38
53	Denver, CO	16.72	0.84	76	Houston, TX	8.40	-0.40
54	Columbia, SC	15.23	-0.76	77	Raleigh–Durham–Chapel Hill, NC	8.11	0.64
55	Wilmington–Newark, DE–MD	14.67	0.47	78	Akron, OH	6.45	0.07
56	Birmingham, AL	14.35	-0.23	79	Tulsa, OK	6.29	-0.78
57	Phoenix–Mesa, AZ	13.95	0.61	80	Kansas City, MO–KS	5.82	-0.79
58	Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV	13.95	0.31	81	El Paso, TX	5.13	0.73
59	Providence–Warwick–Pawtucket, RI	13.87	1.89	82	Fort Worth–Arlington, TX	4.91	-0.27
60	Little Rock–North Little Rock, AR	13.71	-0.85	83	Charlotte–Gastonia–Rock Hill, NC–SC	4.69	-0.53
61	Fresno, CA	12.88	0.91	84	Atlanta, GA	4.08	0.03
62	Greenville–Spartanburg– Anderson, SC	12.87	-0.94	85	Austin–San Marcos, TX	3.76	-0.28
63	Nashville, TN	12.83	-0.41	86	Omaha, NE–IA	3.34	-0.56
64	Louisville, KY–IN	12.69	-0.47	87	San Antonio, TX	3.17	-0.21
65	Memphis, TN-AR-MS	12.18	1.18	88	Greensboro–Winston–Salem– High Point, NC	3.12	-0.29
66	Stockton–Lodi, CA	12.05	0.59	89	Fort Wayne, IN	2.56	-1.22
67	Albuquerque, NM	11.63	0.37	90	Columbus, OH	2.50	0.26
68	St. Louis, MO–IL	11.08	-0.73	91	Oklahoma City, OK	2.46	-0.37
69	Youngstown–Warren, OH	10.52	-0.38	92	Wichita, KS	1.66	-1.19
70	Cincinnati, OH–KY–IN	10.30	-0.58	93	Indianapolis, IN	1.44	-0.74
71	Philadelphia, PA–NJ	10.16	1.13	94	Dayton–Springfield, OH	1.04	-0.50
72	Ann Arbor, MI	9.71	0.31	95	McAllen–Edinburg–Mission, TX	0.93	-0.45
73	Grand Rapids–Muskegon–Holland, MI	9.28	-0.15				

Kochi city | largest undevelopable land UEA

Kochi with 50 km radius circle

Tsukuba-Tsuchiura | Smallest undevelopable land share

Tsukuba-Tsuchiura with 50 km radius circle

Housing stock and price data

- Periods: long differences from 1975 to 2000.
- Housing stock: number of houses from Fixed assets price survey (housing).
- Housing price: land price from Published Land Price Information.

- In Japan, limited availability of information of real estate property prices.
 - Real estate transaction price information has been publicly available only since 2005
 - Prefecture-level residential property price indices have been available since 1984 but only for the three prefectures (Tokyo, Aichi, and Osaka).
- Instead, information on appraisal values of land has been reported by the government for many years (Published Land Price Information System).
 - Appraisal values based on either one of the methodologies (referring transaction prices in the neighborhood, calculating discount cash flow, using costs for land development).
 - Number of points for appraisal is about 15,000-25,000 every year.
 - Majority of them are used for residential purposes (land pieces in more than 18,000 data points out of 26,000 are used for residence in 2017).

- Actually, 70% of housing price are explained by land price in Japan.
 - Noguchi (1994).
- We use price of land for housing as land price information.
 - We restrict samples to sites for housing usage, and take city-level average price per square meters as average city land price.

Table 1.1	Share of La	Share of Land Cost in Housing Cost for Model Cases						
	Land Price per Square Meter ^a	Land Cost (a)	Construction Cost (b)	Total Cost (c)	Ratio (a/c)			
Tokyo			(-)	(-)				
Minato	580	138 371	2 047	140 418	0.985			
Suginami	106	25 289	2,047	27 336	0.985			
Machida	39	9.304	2,047	11.351	0.820			
Other big cities		2,501	-,		0.020			
Osaka	60	10,020	1,469	11,489	0.872			
Nagoya	26	4,342	1,469	5,811	0.747			
Hiroshima	17	2,839	1,469	4,308	0.659			
Fukuoka	14	2,338	1,469	3,807	0.614			
Local cities								
Otaru	4	668	1,469	2,137	0.313			
Akita	5	835	1,469	2,304	0.362			
Toyama	8	1,336	1,469	2,805	0.476			
Kurashiki	6	1,002	1,469	2,471	0.406			
Miyazaki	6	1,002	1,469	2,471	0.406			

Notes: Prices are 10,000 yen. Assumptions are: (1) site, 167 square meters; house, 89 square meters. (2) Housing construction cost per square meter: 230,000 yen in Tokyo, and 165,000 yen in other cities.

^aLand price is local government benchmark price (Kijun Chika), National Land Agency (July 1989).

Table 1.1	Share of La	hare of Land Cost in Housing Cost for Model Cases					
	Land Price per Square Meter ^a	Land Cost (a)	Construction Cost (b)	Total Cost (c)	Ratio (a/c)		
Tokyo							
Minato	580	138,371	2,047	140,418	0.985		
Suginami	106	25,289	2,047	27,336	0.925		
Machida	39	9,304	2,047	11,351	0.820		
Other big cities							
Osaka	60	10,020	1,469	11,489	0.872		
Nagoya	26	4,342	1,469	5,811	0.747		
Hiroshima	17	2,839	1,469	4,308	0.659		
Fukuoka	14	2,338	1,469	3,807	0.614		
Local cities							
Otaru	4	668	1,469	2,137	0.313		
Akita	5	835	1,469	2,304	0.362		
Toyama	8	1,336	1,469	2,805	0.476		
Kurashiki	6	1,002	1,469	2,471	0.406		
Miyazaki	6	1,002	1,469	2,471	0.406		

Notes: Prices are 10,000 yen. Assumptions are: (1) site, 167 square meters; house, 89 square meters. (2) Housing construction cost per square meter: 230,000 yen in Tokyo, and 165,000 yen in other cities.

^aLand price is local government benchmark price (Kijun Chika), National Land Agency (July 1989).

Instruments

- Demand shocks:
 - Bartik (1991) type expected housing demand (population) growth in a city by the composition of industries in 1970 from Population Census.
 - Sum of initial share of each industry in a city times growth of the industry in national-level
 - Forecast city growth from 1970 to 2010 due to the initial composition of the industries.
 - Initial compositions of industries and national-level industry growth are independent from local housing price change.
 - Exogenous urban amenity.
 - Hours of sunshine in a year (measured in 0.1 hours) from Japan Meteorological Agency.
 - Amount of rainfall in a year (measured in 0.1mm) from Japan Meteorological Agency.

Other propositions by Saiz (2010)

- Metropolitan areas with low land availability tend to be more productive or to have higher amenities.
- Population levels in the existing distribution of metropolitan areas should be independent of the degree of land availability.

Correlations

	()	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Log	Log	ΔLog	Log	ΔLog
	population	land price	Land price	Income in	income
	In 2000	in 2000	(1975-2000)	2000	(1975-2000)
Share of	-1.159	0.285	0.400**	-1.545	-0.523***
Unavailable Land	(0.884)	(0.337)	(0.198)	(0.938)	(0. 3)
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	108	108	108	108	108

Correlations

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	ΔLog	Share with	Log	Log
	population	bachelor's	(patents/	hours of
	(1975-2000)	degree	populations)	sunshine
Share of	-0.383***	0.000	-0.267	-0.082
Unavailable Land	(0.077)	(0.000)	(0.444)	(0.050)
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	108	108	108	108

Estimation equation

• The model induces the following housing supply function.

$$\Delta lnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$
Long difference
in land price for
Housing in city k in city k
$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

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$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta lnH_{k} + \sum_{i=1}^{j} R_{k}^{j} + \varepsilon_{k}$$

$$AlnP_{k} = \beta^{S} \Delta lnH_{k} + \beta^{LAND} (1 - \Lambda_{k}) \Delta$$

• $\beta^{S} > 0$, $\beta^{LAND} > 0$ is expected.

Estimation Results

	()	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔLogH	1.968	0.609		0.742
	(.40)	(. 79)		(. 2)
Δ LogH×Share of Unavailable Land		1.675**	-3.195	-5.225
		(0.762)	(3.886)	(5.007)
Δ LogH×Share of Unavailable Land			0.392	0.538
×log(Populations in 1975)			(0.294)	(0.393)
Sample	All	All	All	All
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>N</u>	108	108	108	I08 ₄₀

Results and interpretations

- The interaction effects $\Delta \log H \times \text{share of unavailable land is 1.68}$.
 - Almost three-fold of that in the US.
 - It comes from land scarcity in Japan.
- The coefficient for Δ logH is not significantly positive.
 - Most of the cities in Japan are locked by mountains and oceans.
 - Demand shock always affects to land price with the interaction to share of unavailable lands.
- Interactions between initial population is not significant.
- We calculate the supply elasticity using Column (2).

Rank	UEA	Supply elasticity	Rank	UEA	Supply elasticity		
	l Kochi		0.455	31lse			0.501
	2Nobeoka		0.456	32Sakata			0.502
	3Naha-Urasoe		0.462	33Numazu			0.504
	4Tottori		0.462	34Fukuyama			0.504
	5Matsuyama		0.462	35Kofu			0.504
	6Maizuru		0.467	36Fuji			0.505
	70kinawa		0.468	37Kanazawa			0.507
	8Niihama		0.469	38Matsumoto			0.510
	9lwakuni-Otake		0.470	39Hamamatsu			0.511
	10Hakodate		0.471	40Toyama-Takaoka			0.511
	l I Nagasaki		0.473	41Ube			0.511
	12Shunan		0.474	42Nagano			0.514
	13Matsue		0.474	43 Yatsushiro			0.516
	14Tokushima		0.476	44Himeji			0.516
	15Muroran		0.478	45Akita			0.519
	16Hiroshima		0.481	46Morioka			0.523
	17Imabari		0.481	47Hitachi			0.524
	l 8Fukui		0.481	48Takamatsu			0.525
	19Yonago		0.483	49Nagaoka			0.525
	20Kure		0.486	50Niigata			0.526
	2 I Yamaguchi		0.486	5 I Shimonoseki			0.527
	22Joetsu		0.487	52Kitakyushu			0.528
	23Sasebo		0.487	530kayama			0.528
	24lwaki		0.489	54Ueda			0.530
	25Shimada		0.490	55Aizuwakamatsu			0.530
	26Shizuoka		0.491	56Yamagata			0.539
	270ita		0.491	57Sanjo-Tsubame			0.539
	28Wakayama		0.492	58Kagoshima			0.540
	29Tsuruoka		0.494	59Miyakonojo		42	0.543
	30Miyazaki		0.498	60Hirosaki		-	0.544

Rank	UEA	Supply elasticity	Rank	UEA	Supply elasticity	
	61 Hachinohe		0.546	9 l Anjo		0.640
	62Toyohashi		0.547	92Chitose		0.640
	63Kumamoto		0.555	93 Mito		0.641
	64lizuka		0.557	94Hekinan		0.643
	65 Ishinomaki		0.559	95 Toyota		0.646
	66Kushiro		0.563	96Handa		0.664
	67Gamagori		0.566	97 Kariya		0.675
	68Aomori		0.567	98 Obihiro		0.685
	69Fukushima		0.568	99 Nagoya-Komaki		0.693
	70Fukuoka		0.569	100Utsunomiya		0.715
	71 Koriyama		0.570	101 Yokkaichi		0.721
	72Kitami		0.570	1020ta-Oizumi		0.752
	73Tomakomai		0.579	103 Tochigi		0.840
	74Tsu		0.579	104 Narita		0.873
	75 Maebashi-Takasaki-Isesa	ki	0.580	105 Oyama		0.925
	76Saga		0.587	106 Tokyo		1.017
	77Sendai		0.587	107Koga		1.057
	78Asahikawa		0.588	108Tsukuba-Tsuchiura		1.171
	79Hikone		0.594			
	80Kurume		0.596			
	81 Kobe		0.600			
	820muta		0.600			
	83Kyoto		0.604			
	84Gifu		0.605			
	85 Nishio		0.606			
	860kazaki		0.609			
	87Iwamizawa		0.614			
	88Osaka		0.621			
	89Ogaki		0.623			43
	90Sapporo-Otaru		0.632			

Supply elasticities | US case

Rank	MSA/NECMA name	Supply elasticity	Rank	MSA/NECMA name	Supply elasticity
1	Miami, FL	0.60	26	Vallejo–Fairfield–Napa, CA	1.14
2	Los Angeles–Long Beach, CA	0.63	27	Newark, NJ	1.16
3	Fort Lauderdale, FL	0.65	28	Charleston–North Charleston, SC	1.20
4	San Francisco, CA	0.66	29	Pittsburgh, PA	1.20
5	San Diego, CA	0.67	30	Tacoma, WA	1.21
6	Oakland, CA	0.70	31	Baltimore, MD	1.23
7	Salt Lake City–Ogden, UT	0.75	32	Detroit, MI	1.24
8	Ventura, CA	0.75	33	Las Vegas, NV–AZ	1.39
9	New York, NY	0.76	34	Rochester, NY	1.40
10	San Jose, CA	0.76	35	Tucson, AZ	1.42
11	New Orleans, LA	0.81	36	Knoxville, TN	1.42
12	Chicago, IL	0.81	37	Jersey City, NJ	1.44
13	Norfolk–Virginia Beach–Newport News, VA–NC	0.82	38	Minneapolis–St. Paul, MN–WI	1.45
14	West Palm Beach–Boca Raton, FL	0.83	39	Hartford, CT	1.50
15	Boston–Worcester–Lawrence–Lowell– Brockton, MA–NH	0.86	40	Springfield, MA	1.52
16	Seattle–Bellevue–Everett, WA	0.88	41	Denver, CO	1.53
17	Sarasota–Bradenton, FL	0.92	42	Providence–Warwick–Pawtucket, RI	1.61
18	Riverside–San Bernardino, CA	0.94	43	Washington, DC–MD–VA–WV	1.61
19	New Haven–Bridgeport–Stamford– Danbury–Waterbury, CT	0.98	44	Phoenix–Mesa, AZ	1.61
20	Tampa–St. Petersburg–Clearwater, FL	1.00	45	Scranton–Wilkes-Barre–Hazleton, PA	1.62
21	Cleveland–Lorain–Elyria, OH	1.02	46	Harrisburg–Lebanon–Carlisle, PA	1.63
22	Milwaukee–Waukesha, WI	1.03	47	Bakersfield, CA	1.64
23	Jacksonville, FL	1.06	48	Philadelphia, PA–NJ	1.65
24	Portland–Vancouver, OR–WA	1.07	49	Colorado Springs, CO	1.67
25	Orlando, FL	1.12	50	Albany–Schenectady–Troy, NY	1.70

TABLE VISUPPLY ELASTICITIES (METRO AREAS WITH POPULATION > 500,000)

Supply elasticities | US case

Rank	MSA/NECMA name	Supply elasticity	Rank	MSA/NECMA name	Supply elasticity			
51	Gary, IN	1.74	74	Atlanta, GA	2.55			
52	Baton Rouge, LA	1.74	75	Akron, OH	2.59			
53	Memphis, TN–AR–MS	1.76	76	Richmond–Petersburg, VA	2.60			
54	Buffalo–Niagara Falls, NY	1.83	77	Youngstown–Warren, OH	2.63			
55	Fresno, CA	1.84	78	Columbia, SC	2.64			
56	Allentown–Bethlehem–Easton, PA	1.86	79	Columbus, OH	2.71			
57	Wilmington–Newark, DE–MD	1.99	80	Greenville–Spartanburg–Anderson, SC	2.71			
58	Mobile, AL	2.04	81	Little Rock–North Little Rock, AR	2.79			
59	Stockton–Lodi, CA	2.07	82	Fort Worth–Arlington, TX	2.80			
60	Raleigh–Durham–Chapel Hill, NC	2.11	83	San Antonio, TX	2.98			
61	Albuquerque, NM	2.11	84	Austin–San Marcos, TX	3.00			
62	Birmingham, AL	2.14	85	Charlotte–Gastonia–Rock Hill, NC–SC	3.09			
63	Dallas, TX	2.18	86	Greensboro-Winston-Salem-High Point, NC	3.10			
64	Syracuse, NY	2.21	87	Kansas City, MO–KS	3.19			
65	Toledo, OH	2.21	88	Oklahoma City, OK	3.29			
66	Nashville, TN	2.24	89	Tulsa, OK	3.35			
67	Ann Arbor, MI	2.29	90	Omaha, NE–IA	3.47			
68	Houston, TX	2.30	91	McAllen–Edinburg–Mission, TX	3.68			
69	Louisville, KY–IN	2.34	92	Dayton–Springfield, OH	3.71			
70	El Paso, TX	2.35	93	Indianapolis, IN	4.00			
71	St. Louis, MO–IL	2.36	94	Fort Wayne, IN	5.36			
72	Grand Rapids–Muskegon–Holland, MI	2.39	95	Wichita, KS	5.45			
73	Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN	2.46						

TABLE VI

Inverse supply elasticities and land prices

46

Inverse supply elasticities and land price differences

Comparison with the US results

Results and interpretations

- Housing supply elasticities (housing price responses to demand shocks) are substantially lower (higher) in Japan than in the US.
- It may come from land scarcity in Japan.

Heterogeneous impact of demand shock across different periods

- In the past, three different phases in the real estate market in Japan. The housing supply elasticities might be different in phases.
 - I. Pre-bubble period (-1985).
 - 2. Period of a rapid run-up of real estate prices (from latter half of 1980s to early 1990s).
 - 3. After the bubble burst (from early 1990s up to now).
- Population in Japan is declining now.
 - Especially, populations in regions other than Tokyo is declining.
- There might be heterogeneous impact of demand shock on land price.
 - Negative housing demand may not be affected by available lands.

Share of population in Japanese regions

Estimation Results

	()	(2)	(3)	(4)
ΔLogH	0.609	1.015	0.517	-3.456
	(. 79)	(.27)	(3.439)	(2.982)
Δ LogH×Share of Unavailable Land	1.675**	2.669**	-3.757	4.774
	(0.762)	(.2 3)	(2.446)	(3.500)
Sample	All	1975-82	983-9	1991-2000
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	108	108	108	108

Estimation Results

	()	(2)	(3)
ΔLogH×Share of Unavailable Land	1.589	-9.736***	-3.195
	(3.117)	(2.840)	(3.886)
Δ LogH×Share of Unavailable Land	-0.015	0.771***	0.392
×log(Populations in 1975)	(0.238)	(0.240)	(0.294)
Sample	1975-82	1975-91	1975-95
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	108	108	108

Results

- In economic growth phase (1975-82), the coefficient for Δ logH × share of unavailable land is larger than that estimated in whole periods.
- In bubble-periods (1983-1991), the coefficient turns to be negative (but insignificant). On the other hand, triple interactions ΔlogH × share of unavailable land × initial population is positive.
 - In bubble periods, initially populated regions are more affected by the demand shocks.
- After the bubble burst phase (1991-2000), the coefficient is insignificant.
- Unavailable land works as the significant determinants in housing price in the process of expansions of housing demands.
 - Heterogeneous impacts may exist.

Regulations

- Land use regulation would be a crucial constraint for developing residential space.
 - Saiz (2010) uses Wharton Regulation Index as the measure of land use regulation.
 - There is no such measure in Japanese cities.
- We use floor-area ratio as a proxy for land use regulations.

Role of land-use regulations in Japan

- In this analysis, we have used floor-to-land ratios or their changes over time as a proxy for the strictness of land-use regulations.
- We know it is not equivalent to WRI and needs improvement.
- Characteristics of land-use regulations in Japan.
 - Designation of City Planning Area (都市計画区域).
 - Within the City Planning Area, there are urbanization promotion area (市街化区域) and urbanization control area (市街化調整区域) where construction of structures are prohibited in principle.

 \rightarrow Regulatory arbitrage between urbanization control area and the area which is out of the City Planning Area (都市計画外区域).

- Some municipalities entirely abandon the distinction between urbanization promotion and control areas in order to deal with such regulatory arbitrage.
- We may make use of such different responses among municipalities in order to measure the strictness of land-use regulations.

Estimation Results

	()	(2)	(3)
ΔLogH	0.609	-1.786**	-1.440*
	(. 79)	(0.819)	(0.874)
Δ LogH×Share of Unavailable Land	1.675**	. 9*	1.36 ***
	(0.762)	(0.593)	(0.451)
ΔLogH×Log(Floor-area ratio)		-0.881*	
		(0.511)	
ΔLogH×ΔLog(Floor-area ratio)			0.159
			(0.193)
Sample	All	All	ÂII
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	108	108	I 08 57

Results

- Coefficient for Interaction term between demand shock and floor-area ratio is negatively significant.
- Positive coefficient for the difference of floor-area ratio implies the endogenous land use regulations.
- In the response to the increase of the housing demand, floor-area ratio may be flexibly extended.
- Saiz (2010) address this problem using several measure of preference of anti-growth restrictions of residents.
 - Inspection expenditures. (future work).

Remarks

- This project estimates the supply elasticity in housing market in Japan.
- Share of undevelopable land also significantly increases the inverse housing supply elasticities in Japan.
- Inverse elasticity of housing supply is higher in Japan than the US.
 - Land price is much responded by the demand shock.
 - Supply elasticities are lower than that in the US.
- It comes from scarce land areas in Japan.
- Pre-bubble (high-economic growth) periods has the largest inverse housing supply elasticities.
 - Heterogeneous impact of undevelopable lands:
 - It significantly works with the growth of housing demands.

Remarks

- Endogenous regulation should be addressed in future.
 - Actually, Hilber and Vermeulen (2016, EJ) find that regulations are more crucial for housing price than undevelopable land share.