II. Methods to be implemented for estimating Vietnam's national accounts

2. Evaluation of the availability and reliability of data and proposed procedures allowed to overcome the imperfections and lacunae

    As already indicated in the first part of this paper, the huge amount of statistics produced or monitored by the administration constitutes a heterogeneous mass, regarding both their availability and reliability. A global evaluation of the data corresponding to the different series to be collected or estimated within the framework of the project is proposed using the following codes:

      - A: excellent or good;

      - B: medium; and

      - C: poor or very poor.

    In addition, several complementary explanations are presented along with proposals for specific alternative and indirect methods for estimating different missing or unreliable series. For this purpose, the classification indicated above shall be used.

    1. Population

    a) Total population :B

    b) Labour force and employment :C

    c) Migration :B

    d) Population of the different ethnic groups :A

    It is difficult to get a good grasp of Vietnam's demographic trends before 1945. In 1901, the first " test " census took place in Cochinchina, a French colony. Thereafter, a population - estimation was implemented in 1906 for all Indochina. A new census took place in 1921 based on the one from 1901. The population of the different ethnic groups was reported. In the case of the Chinese population, we have also figures on yearly migration flows from different sources ( Chinese communities self - administration under the supervision of the French police ).

    This census of 1921 did not concern only Cochinchina, but also the protectorates of Tonkin and Annam. In order to provide correct figures and explain various inconsistencies, the administrations used more or less arbitrary coefficients based on variables such as salt consumption per capita.

    These coefficients were abandoned in 1931 and an estimation " as precise as possible " was performed in all French possessions, and again later in 1936, 1943, 1946 ( for the Cochinchina ). These estimates were not more satisfactory despite the effort for homogenising results. In 1951, other population estimates were made for Vietnam, but only for the " controlled " provinces.

    While the census administration performed quite well in Cochinchina, there was no generalised use of reports to count the population of each house or each boat, in Tonkin and Annam. Most of the time it was ultimately the chief of the village who attempted to measure the population of the village. Besides the approximate nature of these accounts, many problems appeared, such as the preferential registration of a good number of Natives in their original village rather than in the place where they actually used resided.

    Regarding employment, acceptable estimates might be obtained for a several sectors : mining, manufacturing in French companies, public utilities, education and, in a broader sense, administration. On the other hand, we have almost no idea of the population engaged in agriculture, fishing, cottage industries or traditional services.

    For these reasons, it appears it would be extremely difficult to utilise effectively the official data both on total and urban ( or rural ) population. A reconstruction of Vietnam's population using an inverse projection method could be the more acceptable solution. If a hypothetical population age structure fits the observed data, we might use the time series and estimate of age structure before WWII for other purposes. It seems safe to assume that in the case of Vietnam, an East Asia agrarian society with a general cultural context of strong emphasis on education, the population between 15 and 60 or 65 years is an acceptable proxy for the labour force, both for male and female.

    A comparative approach could be adopted regarding employment in services, given that Vietnam's social and cultural setting was very close to that of North - East Asian countries : Japan, Korea, Taiwan ( and of course China but data are usually unreliable ). We may also assume that the Industrial structure of Vietnam was similar to those countries, with an important time lag when compared with Japan, but probably with a shorter time lag in the cases of Taiwan and Korea. Employment in education, in civil administration, in railways and in mining should be used as benchmarks for extrapolating employment in other sectors or sub - sectors.

    2. Primary sector : agriculture, fishing, forestry and hunting

    a) agriculture :

      - planted areas :A

      - rice production in quantity : B

      - other cash crops : B

      - livestock : C

      - fruits and vegetables : C

    b) fishing : C

    c) forestry : A

    f) hunting : C

    We have not got comprehensive data on production but it seems safe to assume that official estimates are quite accurate since they were essential for the evaluation of rural income and therefore the enforcement of part of the colonial tax system. We can find official sources reporting on each province or even prefecture but in a very qualitative way " good harvest / poor harvest " rather than quantitative " yield ". As far as rice is concerned, several irregular reports included not only estimates on production, but also on seeds, alcohol, export, personal consumption ( one of the first reports of this kind was released in 1902 ).

    For other products, we have the same kind of documents but with a local specialisation, which allows us to use reports of the local administration. Product areas such as cotton, maize, sugar, coconuts, rubber, pepper, tea, potatoes and taros, beans, tea, coffee, pepper, silk, we may use, in addition to the official production estimates, an indirect method relying upon the export data and consumption estimates to obtain production. But one needs to be very cautious since part of the production originated in Cambodia. When figures are missing, one could assume that local per capita consumption was stable ( this point should be checked carefully however ), and consider that the variation of exports was a good indicator for production fluctuations.

    Official data on buffaloes were very important for the colonial administration, because it was one of the main areas of private capital formation in agriculture. These are thus essential statistics for the purposes of this research. However, we have no comprehensive data but only various reports particularly during plague infestations of animals. Other livestock, pigs, poultry, goats, sheep, dogs, etc., were not carefully monitored, with the exception perhaps of elephants, which were an export item from central Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia to Thailand before WWII.

    Vegetables and fruits were usually neglected but they are essential in estimating the evolution of an effective living standard for the Vietnamese population given their important role in the Vietnamese diet G the quality of the estimate will depend on the work done or nearing conclusion by anthropologists. One finds the same problem with fishing. Sea products, nuoc mam and river fish played an equally important part in the Vietnamese diet. Export statistics are an indication of the activity of Chinese fishermen who were the main source for the exportation of dry or salted fish. Vietnamese fishermen used to sell the fish in the villages and towns close to the shore for immediate consumption or transformation in the food industry. The same applies for hunting, a activity in which several ethnic minorities specialised. Using studies by anthropologists and international trade data we could estimate the share of the export items ( fur and others ) actually paid to the hunters and consider the value of the meat eaten as a measurement of personal consumption.

    Regarding forestry, the quality of the data is a consequence of direct control and management by public authorities of part of the production. The rest was strictly investigated as an element of fiscal policy, except perhaps charcoal production, another essential item in rural and even urban consumption. In a similar way, salt production data are extremely accurate as a consequence of the public monopoly on distribution.

    3. Mining and manufacturing

    a) Mining : A ( both quantity and declared value )

    b) European Manufacturing : B

    c) Chinese and Vietnamese manufacturing : C

    d) Cottage industry : C

    In relation to the control of the concessions, mining activities in Vietnam were carefully monitored by the administration. Various reports indicate the name, production ( in volume and value ) and employment ( blue and white collars ) in each coal mine. The same kind of details are usually available for other mines. However, we can not find similar surveys on the production of clay and kaolin and other construction materials ( sand, stones, marble, etc. ) before the late 1930s. This means we can not use these series for estimating the activity in construction and public works by indirect methods, and also the important traditional production of pottery ( as well as bricks and tiles ).

    French companies form the only part of manufacturing in which relatively abundant sources are existing. But reports to shareholders and other private data of these kind should be treated with caution. For the most important companies, whose shares were quoted on the Paris stock exchange market, we can find a summary of these reports in French yearbooks ( Annuaire Desfossé ) already studied by Jacques Marseille. But the Paris stock market neglected the small and medium - sized European firms. In addition, Chinese and Vietnamese - owned firms, which constituted a growing share of the manufacturing modern sector in the 1920s and 1930s, relied on other financial sources. We have no other choice but to use fiscal data or economic policy reports ( subsidies to Vietnamese entrepreneurs producing strategic components, for example in the electric or telephone equipment sector, in the late 1930s ). The Vietnamese cottage industry ( basketry, silk reeling, textile cottage industry, pottery, nuoc mam, etc. ) was an essential part of manufacturing, if not the most important part. The French administration reported occasionally on several areas or highly specialised villages.

    Depending on the products, we may use export series and try to extrapolate but we need also to estimate domestic demand. Using various sources, we could obtain indications on production of intermediate goods for which there is no indication in other official reports. For example, in the international trade yearbooks, we find that cement was exported from Haiphong in 128 kg barrels ( and we know from other sources the volume corresponding to the domestic demand ). That means that the production of barrels was ongoing in the manufacturing sense in North Vietnam, certainly as subcontractors. We can expect a production equivalent to at least the barrels exported. Assuming a level of price and labour productivity comparable to that prevailing in Taiwan, Hong Kong or Singapore ( or in France ) and in Vietnam, we could even propose a proxy for the added value in this activity and of wages paid to the workers.

    4. Services

    a) Inland transportation : B

    b) Shipping : B

    c) Electric power : A

    d) Telecommunications : A

    e) Banking and insurance : A

    f) Chinese ( or Indian ) informal finance : C

    g) Domestic trade : C

    h) Education and health : B

    i) Civil and military administration : A

    j) Others : C

    In all the services, we observe a sharp contrast between the modern sector controlled by public or private French companies ( railways, tramways, international shipping, electric power, telegraph and telephone ) in which it is possible to obtain precise figures in the yearbooks and archives ( in the final case, data collection implies case studies and therefore a time - consuming process ), and the traditional sector data in which the only choice is to estimate broadly the activity using very indirect methods.

    Official reports related to fiscal policy and tax on boats and junks provide interesting sources including a breakdown of the fiscal receipts by region and size of shipments. The same kind of source could be of great interest for domestic trade : the shop owners or managers paid a tax depending of occupation. But this does not include peddlers, informal activities, and side - business by peasants or other workers. It seems very difficult to speculate on local trade and traditional road transportation. Furthermore, we have very few data on servants, leisure, restaurants, hotels, etc.. It is clear that the demand was segmented and that tremendous differences existed according to income level. Anthropologist may have some light to shed on these issues. We may also assume that in both Vietnam and Taiwan were similar in this regard, and rely on the structure of the labour force, including secondary occupation in the latter country.

    On finance, we are fortunate enough that a comprehensive study was done by Gonjo ( 1994 ) on the Banque de l 'Indochine, a private institution which was the main Bank in Vietnam and had the monopoly of issuing piastre notes and coins. While Gonjo had no direct access to the Banque's Archives, his work is clearly superior to the study of Meuleau ( 1990 ) who was granted financial support by the Banque and almost free access to the private archives of this institution.

    But the collection of time series on interest rates, money supply, deposits and lending in Vietnam was not the main aim of Gonjo's research. We have however discontinuous data, mainly on Indochina as a whole, and in several cases charts without the corresponding tables. Nevertheless, using the references of the French public archives indicated in his book, it is possible to collect the original figures in the annual reports of the Bank. Regarding the other French banks and other financial institutions in Vietnam, including service, we could also rely on official reports and Indochina's statistical yearbooks.

    We will confront however two major difficulties. Firstly, Gonjo's study, and the official reports, are not on Vietnam but on the activities of different financial institutions in all Indochina ( including Cambodia and Laos ), and also Polynesia, New Caledonia, French territories of India, Djibouti, and even part of China ( Yunnan ). Vietnam's currency, the piastre, circulated in all this area and was the official one ( except in Yunnan ). Our aim is to obtain data on Vietnam's money supply, and we will therefore have to estimate those of Cambodia, Laos, etc. The same applies for deposits, loans, and savings by public and private agents and insurance contracts. Secondly, and this is the main problem, we have almost no idea of formal and informal finance by non - European, especially Chinese ( or Sino - Vietnamese and Vietnamese ) merchants and bankers. The same is true for the French citizens from the territories of India ( Pondichery ) who were specialised in high - risk short - term loans, an unattractive niche in the view of Chinese bankers, but an important one nonetheless.

    Finally, let us consider public services and administration : education, health, and also civil and military administration. These sectors present a different kind of difficulty. We have abundant data on employment, enrolment in schools, expenditures, usually on Indochina as a whole but it is not impossible to disaggregate these data to obtain estimates for the three Vietnamese regions, Cambodia and Laos. The main problem is that public services which existed before French rule were gradually incorporated into the framework of the colonial administration and education system. The General Government and other local authorities created substitutes for previous education or administrative institutions but only the activities and employment in the new ones were reported. In addition, many traditional primary schools were privately funded and managed, and the literacy rate, in Chinese characters, was incredibly high in several parts of Tonkin and Annam before the development of the French education system ( Trinh, 1995 ). An efficient traditional health system relying upon private market mechanisms existed in Vietnam like in other East Asian countries of Chinese cultural and scientific tradition. Once again, if no other source exists, it would be advisable to use Taiwan's data, in the first period of Japanese rule, as a proxy for Vietnam.

    5. Consumption

    a) goods and services : B

    b) self - consumption : C

    When production is unknown, estimating consumption data can not be other than an impressionistic guess. For reasons already indicated above in the presentation of production data, the tax system and public monopolies provide reliable information on the consumption of several items : alcohol, tobacco, salt, matches, and for example opium. In addition, we can use international trade data for imported and exported goods allowing us to obtain an acceptable proxy for the consumption of goods such as cement or coal, and even clothes ( but it is not easy to estimate traditional production in villages, using local cotton ).

    Food is obviously the most important share of the consumption, in value, but also the most difficult part to estimate. The cases studied by Gourou ( 1940 G 1945 ) are certainly acceptable for an extrapolation but only on Tonkin during the late 1930s. It would be inappropriate to assume that food consumption or self - consumption was similar in Cochinchina, or constant during French rule. Even if it is a difficult task, our feeling is that we should take responsibility for proposing an estimate of time series for food consumption in the three Vietnamese regions.

    6. Capital Formation

    a) Public infrastructure : A

    b) Private infrastructure : C

    c) Machinery : A

    d) Construction : B

    e) Rural non - infrastructure private productive capital formation : B

    The colonial administration had a problem with capital formation as a concept defined for the purpose of national accounting. Data collection was performed on public infrastructure but not on the private side. Private construction and investment in machinery was not systematically recorded. Investment by the indigenous and Chinese entrepreneurs, either in agriculture, transportation equipment or manufacturing and the cottage industry, was not a matter of much interest, although it was not absolutely neglected. Given the importance of capital formation series for analysing Vietnam's long - term economic dynamics, and changing industrial structure, it is however essential to address these different issues and to collect the available data in order to estimate the various components, using indirect methods.

    Public investment in infrastructure, public works, railways, telecommunication networks, etc., is precisely recorded in the yearly reports on public finance, but usually, the figures are for Indochina as a whole and not for Vietnam. Behind this problem, we have to consider that several natives did not receive wages but contributed to these projects as forced workers or as a way to pay tax ( corveé ). The actual amount of the investment should be corrected to take into account the value of the labour factor. In addition to public investment, an enormous part of capital formation in infrastructure was the result of private local initiatives and investment. Public works aimed at controlling and improving dykes along the medium - sized and small rivers, and irrigation canals, were traditionally the responsibility of local communities. In Cochinchina, only the general scheme of irrigation was funded by public sources. Landowners invested heavily in secondary canals and other forms of land development ( sea walls ).

    Capital formation in machinery could be estimated using machinery imported from France, the UK, the US, Germany, or Japan, as a proxy. We should however verify that domestic equipment production was non - existent, which is a common assumption G but it is likely that modern manufacturing companies, railways, tramways and electric power companies produced part of the equipment in - house. In order to improve the accuracy of the capital formation estimate, a complementary task could be to confront Vietnamese imports series and the export data in the country of origin, concerning the prices of export commodities, for estimating the effective figures of machinery imports. Since we are mainly interested in civil capital formation, public finance documents on expenditures by the French Army and Navy in Indochina could provide indications on military capital formation, and by contrast, the civilian part.

    For estimating residential and non - residential private construction ( public construction is included in the budget ) the most reliable sources are certainly, once again, the reports of the fiscal administration. Indirect methods using the variation in the size of the French population are likely to induce an underestimation given that affluent Natives and Chinese had a living standard equivalent to the average European residents, at least in Cochinchina. In Tonkin, official restrictions existed on the size of Vietnamese houses, especially in Hanoi and other cities. Traditional construction in villages or towns is very difficult to estimate, and the same is true for the small buildings leased out to Vietnamese or Chinese middle class households. The average amount of the rents, monitored by the administration, could be an acceptable proxy if we can measure the pace of urban development ( new constructions in square meters or, using maps of the main cities, the yearly increase of the size of the urban area ).

    Finally, it is better not to neglect rural private productive capital formation. Official reports investigated the amount of labour factor inputs corresponding to the investment in non - annual crops ( pepper, tea, coffee, rubber etc. ). These kinds of surveys were essential to determine, in relation to world market prices, whether the development of such export crops was profitable for the native farmers or for French or Chinese investors. It was an interesting issue for the administration : land was often granted as a concession to these investors who paid a rent to the General Government. We may assume that something like an equilibrium level for rent was considered by the civil servants.

    7. Prices and Wages

    a) wholesale prices : A

    b) retail prices : B

    c) land prices : C

    d) wages : A

    On prices and wages, researchers interested in Vietnam economic history are lucky enough to have a comprehensive set of data, at least after WWI ( however we have the problem of missing values during WWII, which was a period of hyper inflation in the whole of Asia ). Wholesale and retail prices in Saigon and Hanoi were recorded by different institutions. The most reliable series are probably the commodity list of wholesale prices recorded on the markets. It is unclear if all the retail prices were actually recorded or calculated using wholesale price series and ad hoc hypotheses regarding the margin of the traders.

    Different indices were published on food and housing rent and on living costs for three categories of residents : European, Asian White Collar, Asian Blue Collar. The original series are certainly daily, but the most easily available ones are monthly and of course yearly average data. A rapid survey on monthly variation indicates significant volatility, especially for rice and other basic food products. In addition, huge differences existed between the different regions of Vietnam and also between the countryside and the main cities.

    Despite this positive news, we have to acknowledge we were unable to find land prices series, until now. They are certainly somewhere in the archives, where we will find reliable data to be used for fiscal polices G the Bank of Indochina certainly used to monitor this evolution. We have also several problems relating to export ( and import ) prices, which are presented in detail in section 9 on international trade.

    In comparison, we have a good knowledge of wages in various sectors in terms of different categories of worker engaged in the public sector, including the opium monopoly and railways. Wages paid to the coolies in rubber plantations, to the day labourers in different parts of Vietnam, and to servants are also quite easy to find. Using these series as benchmarks, it might be possible to estimate the wages in other private activities, such as mining, manufacturing and above all for services in the traditional sector.

    8. Public Finance

    a) General Government : B

    b) local administration : A

    As far as public finance is concerned, the situation is extremely clear : we have very good sources and comprehensive data after 1895, and almost nothing prior to that. The end of WWII and the outbreak of the Indochina war constitute an obviously difficult period but, with the exception of 1945, there should be complementary unpublished sources available in the archives.

    Local administration is the easiest part of the research. For the central government ( Indochina General Government ) it is necessary to operate a geographical distribution of the receipts and expenditures. This implies a need to reconstitute the effective allocation of funding dedicated to public works, military expenses, construction, civil servants, etc. to Annam, Cochinchina, Tonkin, Laos, Cambodia ( including the sale of public assets, land concessions, etc. ). Part of Cochinchina's budget surplus was routinely transfered to Vietnamese budgets, or to Laos, or even Cambodia.

    9. International trade

    a) Volume : A

    b) Value : C

    c) Prices : B

    We need to be very cautious about international trade data because the colonial administration used different procedures to compensate for the lack of trained customs officers and other lower rank workers. The first problem is the result of a proxy volume = weight for estimating the value of exported or imported goods. Machinery or other manufacturing goods were measured in cubic meters and then converted into weight. If we neglect this problem, volume data can be considered and are reliable.

    Another proxy used by the custom officer was that import or export prices of several goods were constant over the time. For several products, huge differences are observed between effective market prices and administrative prices. In order to avoid this kind of inconstancy in time series, we suggest that one calculate the implicit export price or import price of the main traded items. When necessary, one might use an estimate of the effective export price : an appropriate margin ( of the representative export company ) would be added to the local wholesale price. The same kind of procedure could be used for imported goods.

    We will also have to remember that custom officials considered the international trade of Indochina as a whole and not of Vietnam. However, by chance, the administration used to also monitor transit trade between Cambodia and Cochinchina, or between Yunnan and Tonkin. Assuming that trade between Indochina and Thailand at the Cambodian or Lao border was negligible, we could estimate directly Vietnam's trade. But it seems useful to check the amount and volume of Cambodian international trade on the basis of the amount controlled by custom officers at different places on the border or in the ports on the Gulf of Siam. Another problem results from the concept of exports by private companies. It was not uncommon for a firm producing in Tonkin, for example a big French - owned spinning company, to declare as export the amount of the goods sold not only in Cambodia and Laos, but also in Cochinchina.

    10. Exchange rates, capital flows and balance of payments

    a) Exchange rates : A

    b) Capital flows : C

    c) Balance of payments : B

    Relatively abundant data are available on exchange rates, capital flows and balance of payments, but mostly concerning exchange rates in Saigon and public flows.

    Both the French franc and the piastre were used for local transactions in Indochina G the French franc was the most important currency for public contracts ( bonds issued on Paris stock market for public investment in Indochina and their repayment by the colonial administration, payment to local firms for public works for the General Government, wages of French civil servants, etc. ) or international trade, even if several figures were published in piastre. The colonial administration used to display amounts in local currency while calculating in French francs, especially in the case of public finance. Besides the official exchange rate of the piastre vis à vis the franc, a market rate was monitored, in Saigon, by the Banque de l 'Indochina. We have yearly and monthly averages for sterling, the US dollar and most Asian currencies between 1913 ( or 1923 ) and 1940.

    Differences in standard ( silver versus gold ) before 1914 and financial turmoil between 1914 and 1940 explained the instability of the piastre - franc exchange rate and the lag of the official rate behind the market rate. As a silver currency, the piastre followed the trend of depreciation of its main trading partners ( Hong Kong and China ), who were also on the silver standard. After 1930, the French franc peg changed the rules and amplified the volatility of the piastre vis - à - vis other Asian currencies. Due to the shortage of silver coins, a ban on its export was decided on in 1905, and this induced a dual circulation of the piastre, in Indochina on the one hand, and in Hong Kong and Singapore on the other hand. It would be interesting to check the differences between exchange rates in Indochina and Hong Kong or Singapore during this period. In addition, collecting data on market exchange rates in Hanoi ( Banque de l' Indochina's data are on Saigon's exchange market ) would allow one to estimate average rates for Vietnam.

    On capital flows and balance of payments in Indochina, first estimates are found in the official report of the colonial administration as early as 1907. But the authors used to neglect a large fraction of private capital flows. More precisely, they had absolutely no idea about the transfers by Chinese merchants into Indochina of gold or foreign currencies. The implicit assumption is that Indochina's trade surplus, mostly the export of paddy and rice by Chinese firms, was sufficient to finance further expansion, either in agriculture, food processing, trade or private construction. Regarding French companies, the monitoring of real investment into Vietnam, and profit repatriation, was a difficult task. France was probably the main source of direct investment or portfolio investment, but other European countries should not be neglected. During WWII, many French - Japanese joint - ventures were established in mining, trade and forestry which corresponded to real business agreements and effective capital flows, at least at the beginning.

    Before 1945, all these data are for Indochina as a whole and we have therefore to estimate capital flows between Vietnam and Cambodia or Laos. The most important part corresponds certainly to transfers by the General Government to Cambodia, but essentially to Laos. French ( or other foreign ) private investment in Cambodia and Laos was concentrated in rubber plantations, forestry and mining and for a limited number of cases. For the 1945 - 54 period, the balance of payments concerns Vietnam but the documents can not be considered reliable. Part of the country was under control of the Viet Minh whose administration exported both goods and services, and in addition received grants in kind from the Chinese Communist Party, and also through China or France, from USSR.